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The Hawley - Smoot Tariff Aot of 1930 established the 
highest tariff wall in the United States history. This was 
followed by the increase of trade barriers in many countries 
in the world and contributed to some extent to the reduction 
of the flow of international trade. This shrinking world 
trade during the early depression years prompted the New 
Deal admini stration to make an effort toward reducing the 
unnecessarily high tariff barriers with the passage of the 
Trade Agreements Act of 1934. 
The Trade Agreements Act of 1934 marked an important 
change in the United States tariff treatment. The Act 
granted authority to the President, within certain limita-
tions, to negotiate executive trade agreements with foreign 
countries without the need for further congressional approval . 
Thus, for the first time, the Act shifted control of tariff 
levels from t he U. s. Sena te to the President. The Act 
us ed the principl e of the most-favored-nat i on clause to 
broaden the applicability of particular duty reductions to 
the entire tariff treatment of imports. This enabled the 
Uni t ed Sta t es to be in a better posi t i on i n securing non-
discriminatory treatment f or i t s exports , whi ch was mo stly 
1 
needed during that period when domestic industries were 
increasingly dependent upon foreign markets. 
2 
Since its enactment, the Trade Agreements Act of 1934 
has been renewed periodically. The need for renewal gave 
the opposition to the law frequent opportunities for new 
attacks on any attempts of drastic tariff reductions. 
Opponents sought to undermine the whole Trade Agreements 
Program and settled for restrictive changes when they could 
not prevent an extension. In the early forties, the so-
called escape clause became part of the Trade Agreements 
Program. It resulted from a compromise between the pro-
tectionist forces who hoped to break down the Trade Agree-
ments Program with the use of the escape clause and the free 
trade interests who eXllected the escape clause not to have 
any significant effect in actual application. 
The escape clause in reciprocal trade agreements 
provides that if an article, due to the tariff concession, 
is imported into this country in such increased amounts as 
to cause or threaten serious injury to the domestic industry 
producing that particular article, this country has the right 
to modify or withdraw the tariff concession on this article 
so as to give relief to the domestic industry involved. 
The first escape clause was included in the Reciprocal 
Trade Agreement between the United States and Mexico in 
1942. Since that time, Congress made it mandatory that the 
escape clause must be included in every Reciprocal Trade 
Agreement. The specific wording of the clause has been 
3 
changed in renewal laws passed since that time, reducing 
gradually the discretionary judgement of the executive. 
These increasing restrictions reduced the bargaining power 
of the President so much that he abandoned the Reciprocal 
Trade Agreement system in 1962. Congress substituted the 
Trade Expansion Act with a new appr.oach to the foreign 
economic policy of the United States. An escape clause was 
included, but its meaning changed very much. During the 
period of two decades, the escape clause has been a matter 
of' strong dispute between free traders and protectionists in 
.American business and politics. It is the purpose of this 
paper to discover what impact the escape clause has made on 
the economy of the United States. 
In order to examine the economic consequences of the 
escape clause, we shaJ.l first examine the legislative 
development of the escape clause. In the following chapter, 
we shall need to take a hard look at the actual application 
ot the escape clause. We shall, then, examine the products 
which have become the subject of escape clause investigations 
and study the impact made on the trade in these products, 
both with reference to domestic and foreign trade. We shall 
consider not only the changes in the amount produced and 
sold, but also the changes in prices, in the introduction of 
alternatives and related economic phenomena in order to 
learn the effects of the escape clause procedures. Finally, 
an evaluation of the impact of escape clause provisions will 
conclude the study. 
CHAPTER II 
THE LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ESCAPE CLAUSE 
The escape clause was a political compromise between 
those who advocated freer trade through the enactment of 
the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act and those who opposed it. 
In reality, we might say with some justification that the 
escape clause was the result of the compromise between the 
Administration and the Congress as well as between the 
Democrats and the Republicans. This understanding is very 
helpful for the grasp of the legislative development of the 
escape clause. Besides, the escape clause provisions not 
only were closely related but becam~ in fact, part of the 
trade agreements legislation. Therefore, in qur discussion 
of the legislative development of the escape clause, we lean 
heavily on the general background of the history of the Trade 
Agreements Acts. 
This chapter will be divided into four sections. In 
the first section, we shall discuss the historical background 
which indicated a need for the insertion of the escape clause 
in the Trade Agreement Acts. It covers the period from 
1934, when the first Trade .Agre.ements. Aqt .. was . enacted to 
December, 1942, before the first inclusion of the escape 
clause in the Reciprocal Trade Agre.emen:t between ,.the. Un1.ted , 
4 
5 
States and Mexico. In the second section, we shall examine 
the early development of the escape clause with its apparent 
harmlessness to the Trade Agreement Program. It lasted 
from December, 1942, to the passage of the Trade Agreements 
Extension Act of 1951. In the third section, we shall take 
a look at the expanding scope of the escape clause with the 
growing strength of the protectionist forces. It covers the 
period from 1951 to the passage of the Trade Expansion Act 
of 19620 In the last section, we shall deal with the escape 
clause since 1962. 
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Before the Escape Clause 
Protective tariffs in the United States are almost as 
old as the history of the country. When President Roosevelt 
in 1934 submitted his message to the Congress for the request 
of the passage of the Trade Agreements Act, he maintained 
the rule of "no injury" by saying that"••• so as to give 
assurance that no sound and important American interest will 
·be injuriously disturbed." 1 In spite of his assurance, the 
Republican minority in 9ongress argued that the delegation of 
authority to the Preside!lt was unconstitutional, that the 
provision of unconditional most-favored-nation treatment and 
the abandonment of the cost-equalization f ormula deni ed any 
hope for the protection of domestic producerso Therefore, 
they tried to include more restrictive amendments such as 
1u. s. Congress, House Mi-scellaneous Document s, No. 273, 
73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1934, Po 2. 
6 
providing for Congressional majority approval of all trade 
agreements. 2 The Trade Agreements Act of 1934 was neverthe-
less passed and became law mainly due to the large majority 
of the Democrats both in the House and in the Senate.3 
In this description of the legislative background of 
the passage of the Trade Agreements Act of 1934, we discover 
the needs of an escape clause in trade agreements legisla-
tion. On the one hand, the Administration, representing 
free trade interests, advocated the reduction of tariffs 
and the removal of other trade barriers so as to promote 
more exports and to benefit the consumer. On the other hand, 
a majority of the elected representatives in Congress, 
represented some protectionist interests and were assured 
by their constituents that free trade would injure specific 
domestic industries which in turn would aggravate and prolong 
the depression. This conflict of interests seemed to 
suggest some form of compromise at a later dateo 
Three years later in 1937, when the Trade Agreements 
Act of 1934 was about to expire, the Administration and the 
majority of Democrats in Congress claimed that the Trade 
Agreements Act had proven to be successful so far in helping 
to overcome the Great Depression and that the extension of 
the Act could further make a substantial contribution t o the 
2see U. s. Congress, Congressional Record, 73rd Congo , 
2nd Sess., Vol. LXXVIII, Pto 10 (June 4, 1934), p. 10370. 
3For t he content of the 1934 Act, s ee Th~ United Stat es 
Statutes at Large, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., Vol. XLVIII, Pt • .. 1 , 
1934, pp. 943-945. 
maintenance of world peace at a time of increasing tension 
in international relations. 4 However, the protectionists 
argued that there was no direct relation at all between the 
Trade Agreements Act and the domestic recovery, and that 
many domestic industries were injured because of the 
importation of foreign articles. Realizing that the Act 
7 
would be continued, they proposed several restrictive am.end-
ments and tried to water down the Trade Agreements Program 
indirectly. Nevertheless, the Trade Agreements Extension 
Act of 1937 was passed in the original form of the 1934 Act 
and extended for another three years. 
The passage of the Act proved to be more difficult in 
1937 than in 1934. Twenty Democratic Senators voted in 
favor of the amendment which provided the adoption of the 
cost-equalization formula on agricultural and horticultural 
products and they also voted against the passage of the final · 
extension bill. They were from Western and Southern states 
where agricultural interests prevailed. This fact reflected 
the conflict between free trade and protectionist . interests 
and indicated a growing need for an instrument of compromise. 
The Trade Agreements Act. was to expire again in 1940. 
The Administration asked for a three-year extension of the 
4For example, in the letter with reference to the 
extension of the Trade Agreements Act, Cordell Hall pointed 
out, "In the years which lie immediately ahead, an adequate 
revival of international trade will be the most powerful 
danger of the war," U. s. Congress, Senate Committee on 
Finance , Hearings on H. J. Res. 96 , 75th Congo , 1st Sess., 
Pt. 1, 1937, p. 4. 
8 
law in its original form. This time the difficulty to renew 
the Act was even greater, because, in the protectionist 
viewpoint, the United States economy was no longer in a 
depressed situation and therefore there was no need to 
continue an emergency measure such as the Trade Agreements 
Act. President Roosevelt countered this argument with a new 
theme: the Trade Agreements Act was needed as "an indis-
pensable part of the foundation of any stable and durable 
peaceo 11 5 
The protectionists maintained that the Trade Agreement s 
Program had been enlarged far beyond its originally intended 
scope. They especially attacked the principle of uncondi tion-
al most-favored-nation treatment, which, they claimed to 
have caused serious injury for a number of domestic pro-
ducers. Therefore, they tried to undermine the Program by 
restrictive amendments. 6 Moreover, this time they obtained 
additional help both from the Administration and Congress. 
Vice President Garner favored Senator Walsh's proposal of 
one-year extension. 7 Senator Pittman, Chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Relation Committee, proposed a restrictive 
5uo s. Congress, Senate Committee on Finance, Hearings 
on H.J. Res. 407, 76th Cong., 3rd Sesso, 1940, p. 5. 
6For example, Senator J. c. O'Ma.hony proposed the 
amendment of the need f or Congressional approval for all 
trade agreements. See U. s. Congress, Senate Committee on 
Finance, Hearings on H.J. Res. 407, 76th Cong. , 3rd Sess., 
1940, p. 183. . 
7 See U. s. Congress , Congressional Record , 76t h Cong. , 
Jrd Sess., Vol . LXXXIV, Pt. 4 (April 5, 1940), p . 4075. 
amendment requiring congressional approval of all trade 
agreements. 8 
The Trade Agreements Act was finally extended in its 
original form until 1943, mainly due to the efforts of 
President Roosevelt who retained some control over his 
Democratic majority. Although the Act was renewed, the 
protectionist forces grew rapidly and became more difficult 
to controlo The Administration decided, therefore, to take 
steps early to prevent the Program from being voted down at 
the next renewal. In this general setting, the escape 
clause was introduced into the Trade Agreements Act as a 
political compromise first adopted by the Administration. 
The Escape Clause From 1942 to 1951 
The possibility of the use of the escape clause as a 
9 
means of compromise seemed to have been realized even before 
1940. This can be seen in Senator Walsh's reason for the 
proposal of a one-year extension of the 1940 Act. 9 But it 
was not until December 23, 1942, that an escape clause was. 
included in the Reciprocal Trade Agreement between the United 
8see U. s. Congress, Congressional Record: A~pendixt 
76th Cong., 3rd Sess., Vol. LXXXVI, Pt. 14 (March, 1940J, 
p. 1237. 
9The Senator said, "••• The Congress will, between now 
and another year, try to remove complaints to which I 
referred, and bring about more liberal action in making use 
of the 'escape' clause in these agreements." U. s. Congress, 
Congressional Record~ 76th Cong. , 3rd Sess. , Vol . LXXXVI, 
Pt. 4 (April 5, 1940J, p. 4076. 
10 
States and Mexico, effective January 30, 1943. 10 
In the trade agreement with Mexico, the beginning of the 
first paragraph of Article XI reads as follows: 
If, as a result of unforeseen developments 
and of the concession granted on any artic.le 
enumerated and described in the Schedules 
annexed to this Agreement, such article is 
being imported in such increased quantities 
and under such conditions as to cause or 
threaten serious injury to domestic p~oducers 
of like or similar articles, the Government 
of either country shall be free to withdraw 
the concession, in whole or in part, or to 
modify it to the extent and for such time 11 
as may be necessary to prevent such injury. 
The Administration initiated this clause to demonstrate to 
the protectionists that the interests of the domestic 
industries would be properly safeguarded. 
Vv.hen the Trade Agreements Act was ready to expire in 
1943, the Administration and the . Democrats based their 
arguments for renewal mainly on expected postwar economic 
problems and the need for reconstruction in Europe. 
10see The United States Statutes at Large, 78th Cong., 
1st Sess., VoI. LVII, Pt. 2, pp. 833-8,f. Some writers such 
as Kravis, however, dated the origin of the escape clause 
to Article XII of the Trade . Agreement with Argentina on 
October 14, 1941. See Irving B. Kravis, "The Trade Agree-
ments Escape Clause," .American Economic Review·~ XLIV (June, 
1954), p. 321. The reason Kravis dated Article XII as the 
origin of the escape clause probably was that in the Article 
we could find such a phrase as "prejudicing an industry. 11 
But this was not yet the modern version of an escape clauseo 
That the Mexico agreement was the first to include an escape 
clause was expressed by the U. s. Tariff Commission. See 
U. S. Tariff Commission, Investigations Under the Escape 
Clause of Trade Agreements, 15th ed., T. C. Pubiication 116 
(December, 1963), p. 1. 
11 The United States Statutes at Large, 78th Cong., 
1st Ses~ Vol. LVII, Pt. 2, p. 84"57 
1 1 
Secretary Hull especially emphasized the adoption of such 
effective safeguards as the escape clause in the trade agree-
ment with Mexico. The State Department claimed in support 
of the extension: 
The agreements provide valuable insurance, 
no~ against a repetition of the tidal wave 
of trade barriers and discriminations that 
- swept over the world after the last war.12 
Eventually, in 1943, the Trade Agreements Act was 
extended in. its original form, but for only two years, as 
a result of the growth of protectionist forceso The earlier 
use of the escape clause had undoubtedly contributed to the 
passage of the Act in 1943. 
Extension of the law seemed assured in 1945 but con-
siderable attention was centered on the problem of adequate 
safeguards for domestic producers in the event of further 
tariff reductions. The escape clause fitted this purpose 
because it provided for the withdrawal of concessions. The 
Administration assured Congress during the hearings that 
a general escape clause be included in all future 
agreements. 13 
The Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1945 granted a 
three-year estension and broadened the President's authorityo 
He could now increase or decrease by 50 per cent the rates 
12The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. VIII, Noe 191 
(February 20, 1943), Po 1730 . 
13u. s. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means , 
Hearings on H. R. 3240, 79th Cong. , 1st Sesso, revised edo, 
1945, pp. 274-282. 
12 
in existence on June 1, 1945 (not on July 1, 1934). Whenever 
duties had been reduced by 50 per cent before the deadline, 
the total reduction could reach now 75 per cent. 
The State Department was now equipped for a round of 
tariff cutting and called for broad negotiations at Geneva 
in April, 1947. With the change to a Republican majority 
in Congress in 1946, the State Department agreed to include 
the escape clause in all treaties to be reached at the 
Geneva negotiationso This compromise took the form of 
Executive Order Noo 9832 issued by President Truman on 
February 25, 19470 14 Part I of the Executive Order 9832 
required to insert in all future trade agreements an escape 
clause whose wording was the same as that in the trade 
agreement with Mexico in 1942. Therefore, in conformity 
with this order, an escape clause was included in the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) on October 30, 
1947, which included the results of the Geneva Conference. 15 
However, the Executive Order 9832 did establish neither 
procedures nor criteria for the administration of the escape 
clause, especially with respect to the finding of serious 
injury. Therefore, on July 25, 1947, the House Committee on 
Ways and Means adopted a resolution requiring the Tariff 
14see Code of Federal Registrations: Title 3 - The 
President, 1943-1948 Compilation, pp. b24-626o 
15see Article XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade in United Sta tes Statutes at Large, 80th Cong., 
1st Sesso, Vol. LXI, Pt. 5, 1947, pp~A58- A60. 
Commission to establish criteria for the determination of 
serious injury . In compliance with this resolution, the 
Tariff Commission on February 24, 1948, issued a report 
entitled Procedures and Criteria with Respect to the 
Administration of the Escape Clause in Trade Agreements. 
13 
When the President requested the extension of the Trade 
Agreements Act for another three years in 1948, a Republican 
Congress was ready to let the Act die when it expired. The 
Trade Agreements Extension of 1948 became the most re-
s t rictive one since 1934; it introduced the peril point 
provision and greatly reduced the President's authority to 
negoti ate t ariffso The Act did not deal with the escape 
clause procedures; though the Executive Order 10004 of 
October 5, 1948, superseded the Executive Order 9832 dealing 
wi th the same subject, the escape clause procedures remained 
basi cally unchanged. 
The very restrictive extension of 1948 lasted only one 
yearo Af ter his election vi ctory, President Truman informed 
Congress that "the restrictive provisions and limited 
extension" of the 1948 Act were "materially hampering the 
effect i veness of t he United States ' participat ion" i n t he 
effort of "bui lding a stable and pro sperous worl d" by 
r emoving unnec es sary obstacle s o 16 Congr ess f ailed to comply 
with hi s request in time for the start of tariff negotiations 
at .Armecy, France , but an extension of the law to 1951 was 
16uo So Congre s s , House Commi ttee on Ways and Means , 
He arings on Ho R. 121 1, 81st Congo, 1st Sesso, 1949 , P o 2. 
14 
passed before the end of the year. 
The Trade Agreements Act of 1949 was less restrictive 
than the previous law. The "emergency" tariff changes 
established in the Trade Agreements Act in 1934 was finally 
accepted as a normal process, because the language in the 
preamble referring to "the present emergency" was removed 
from the 1949 Act. 
Although the Trade Agreements Program came to be 
regarded as the normal process of tariff-ma.king in 1949, 
the protectionist forces were not reconciledo The role of 
the escape clause during the forties had disappointed 
protectionist interests; it was inserted into the Reciprocal 
Trade Agreements principally as a compromise to appease the 
opposition to lower duties. The escape clause had not bee.n 
invoked successfully in this period of its early development. 
Expanding Scope of the Escape Clause 
When the Trade Agreements Act was about to expire in 
1951, President Truman requested a three-year extension of 
the Act in its existing form, which was less liberal than 
the recommendations made in the Gray Reporto 17 The long 
experience with the trade agreements legislation greatly 
facilitated the attack by protectionist interests • . They 
knew that the escape clause in the past had not been applied 
easily. Thus, the extension act of 1951 included among 
17see Report to the President ..Q!}. Foreign Economic 
Policies, (Washington D. C.: Ua Sa Government Printing 
Office, November 10, 1950), PPo 16-17 and PPo 78-800 
others a revival of the peril point of 1948 and a changed 
escape clause which was more restrictiveo The changes in 
the law have led Wilkinson to point out, 
It may be said with some justifications that 
if the trade agreements legislation of 1945 
represented the zenith of the Trade Agreements 
Program, the Extensiou Act of 1951 was 
certainly the nadiro 1b 
The attack on the escape clause under the Executive 
Order 9832 emphasized three points .. 19 First, thousands of 
rates had been reduced in trade agreements, and yet the 
escape clause had been invoked only once in tb,e case of 
women's fur felt hat and hat bodieso Second, even should 
15 
a complaint result in escape action, domestic producers had 
to wait for the completion of a long investigationQ Third, 
Congress had already shown its lack of confidence in existing 
escape clause procedures by legislating import quotas on 
cheese and other dairy products~ 
The opposition further argued that all these weaknesses 
in the escape clause procedures were the result of the "lack 
of any standards established by Congress for the President's 
18 Joe Ro "Wilkinson, Poli tics §U.£ Trade Poli.c;y, 
(Washington D., Co: Public Affairs Press, 1960), pp., 65-660 
19The growth of protectionists and their abhorance to 
the United States participation in GATT could be exemplified 
by looking at the reason why Senator Malone introduced a 
bill to terminate the authority of the President to enter 
into trade agreementso He said, 0 If the Torquay Agreements 
will become effective it will mean the final abandonment 
of the working men, small-business men, and industrialists 
of this nationod UQ So Congress, Con ressional Record, 
82nd Cong.,, 1st Sessa, Vol. XCVII, Pto 2 March 14, 1951), 
p.. 2402 .. 
16 
guidance in determining when relief should be grantedo 1120 
"In order to remedy this unfortunate situation," they recom-
mended precise rules to replace that "patent looseness and 
ambiguity of the language of the escape clause 11 in .order to 
assure domestic producers of prompt. reliefo 21 
The escape clause in section 6(a) of the 1951 Act was 
worded as follows: 
No reduction in any rate of duty o•o shall be 
permitted to continue in effect when the 
product on which the concession has been 
granted is, as a result, in whole or in part, 
of the duty or other customs treatment 
reflecting such concession, being imported 
into the United States in such increased 
quantities, either actual or relative, as 
to cause or threaten serious injury to the 
domestic industry pro~~cing like or directly 
competitive products. 
Section 6(b) tightened the restrictions; 
The President, as soon as practicable, shall 
take such act·ion as may be necessary to bring 
trade agreements o .... int·o conformi t;y with the 
policy e~tablished in subsection (a) of this 
sectiono 3 
Thus, for the first time, the Trade Agreements Extension Act 
of 1951 made it mandatory for an escape clause to be in-
cluded in all trade 1::tgreements and turned into a congression-
al mandate what had been the administrative policy .. 
20uo So Congress, House Committee on Ways and ]/Jeans, 
Report to Accompany li" ~ .. 1612, 82nd Congo, 1st Sess~, 
Rep .. No .. 14 (January 29, 1951}, p .. 23 .. 
1st 
21 Ibido 
22The United_States Statutes-~ Larg~, 
Sess .. , 1951, Volo LX:/, po 73., 
23Ibid .. 
82nd Cong .. , 
17 
A comparison of the wording of the escape clause in 
the 1951 Act with earlier styles shows several differences 
which made the new form more restrictive. 
The older version said nothing about factors that should 
be considered by the .Tariff Commission in making a determi-
nation of serious injury, but in the 1951 Act, these factors 
were listed in section 7(b). The subsection reads as 
follows: 
aoo The Tariff Commission, without excluding 
other factors, shall take into consideration 
a downward trend of production, employment, 
prices, profits, .or wages in the domestic 
industry concerned, or a decline in sales, 
an increase in imports, either actual· or 
relatiye to domestic production, a :high or 
growing inventory, or a decline in the 
proportion of the domestic market supplied 
by domestic producers.24 
Each one of the factors listed was considered sufficient by 
itself to trigger the escape clause mechanismQ As long as 
the Tariff Commission found the presence of one listed 
factor, the domestic industry was entitled to reliefo 
In its earlier form, the escape clause would apply if 
the increased impor-ts caused serious injury as the result 
not only of the concession but also of "unforeseen develop-
mentso 11 The omission of "unforeseen developments 11 in 1951 
facilitated the invocation of the escape clause, but this 
change in wording later became a problem because the clause 
18 
in the 1951 Act was not consistent with that in the GATT. 25 
The Executive Order 9832 required that imports had to 
be entering in "increased quantity" before the escape clause 
could apply, but the 1951 Act changed the wording to 
11 increased quantities, either actual or relative." Therefore, 
the Act of 1951 made it clear that· though i.~ports, might have 
declined absolutely, the escape clause could be invoked if 
imports were larger, in relation to domestic output, or con-
sump·tion, than before. 
Another impo~tant change under the 1951 Act was the 
requirement of compulsory investigation by the Tariff 
Commission whenever a domestic industry applied. Under the 
former system, the Tariff Commission was required to make 
investigations in response to applications only if, in the 
Comrnission•s judgement, there was ugood and sufficient 
reason" to do so. These major changes in the escape clause 
treatment of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 
indicated that the protectionist forces had made progress 
in their effort of undermining the Trade Agreements Program 
25For example, in 1957, the United States withdrew 
concession on "spring clothespins" under Article XIX 
of the GATT. Denmark, Sweden, United Kingdom and Belgium, 
then, at the 12th session of the cont~acting parties, 
complained that the U .. s. action was not justified, 
because the increase in imports of II spring clothespins•• 
could not be considered as 11 unforeseeno 11 See United 
States Tariff Commission, OQeration of Trade Agreements 
Program, 11th Re~ort, July 1957-June-;958, (Washington D. C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1959), pp. 48-49. 
19 
through the escape clause legislation~ 26 
The Republican victory in November, 1952, resulted in 
a lukewarm request for a one-year extension of the Trade 
Agreements Act in 195.3., Without enthusiastic support of the 
Program by the Administration, the setting in 1953 was 
propitious for those who wanted to weaken the program .. 
Official studies over the years had always favored a 
low-tariff goal in the best ;interest of the nation. The 
Gray report was followed by the Bell report with even more 
emphasis on reducing trade barriers. In 1953, the more 
comprehensive Randall report reaffirmed the same position 
in favor of stimulating free trade~ In spite of these 
official pronouncements Congress extended the Trade Agree-
ments Extension Act in 1953 for only one year and included 
two restrictive changes in the escape clause procedure .. 
The first change required the Uo s. Tariff Commission 
to complete its investigation and report in nine months 
instead of one year as under the previous lawa The second 
change ordered the Tariff Commission to submit reports to 
the President in those escape clause cases in which the 
Commission's votes were evenly divided. The President could 
adopt the views of either side as the decision of the Commissiono 
26Also the 1951 Act as in the Executive Order, 
required that the escape clause action once taken was to 
remain in effect only "for the time necessary to prevent 
or remedy 11 the serious injuryu In conformity with this, 
the President, by issuing the Executive Order 10401 of 
October 14, 1952, required the Tariff Commission to submit 
the escape clause annual review report to himo 
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President Eisenhower, on March 30, 1954, sent a message 
to Congress with his recommendations concerning the foreign 
economic policy of the United States. He requested a three-
year extension of the Trade Agreements Act with fewer 
restrictions, but retaining the escape clause and peril 
point provisions as recommended by the Randall Commissiono 
After a long debate, the Act of 1954 was a virtually un-
changed continuation of the existing law for only one year 
with no change in escape clause procedure. 
In 1955 the Administration asked again for a three-year 
extension with slightly broader powers to cut tariffso No 
change in the escape clause was asked; in fact, Secretary of 
State Dulles told Congress, "The value of the escape clause" 
was 11 to lead foreign countries to exert an influence to cut 
down exports to the United States which might otherwise lead 
to invoking the escape clause.n 27 Congress, once again 
controlled by the Democrats, extended the law for a three-
year period; the Trade Agreements Act of 1955 had a number 
of more restrictive amendments. 
These included 1) a national security provision; 2) sub-
stantial changes in the escape clause procedure .. The 
national security provision brought the Office of Defense 
Mobilization into the evaluation machinery of the nation's 
foreign trade.. The law reads as follows: 11 If an article is 
being imported into the United States in such quantities as 
27u. s. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, 
HearingsonH .. R .. 1, 84thCong., 1st Sess., 1955, Pt~ 1, p. 68 .. 
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to threaten to impair the national security," the President 
of the Uo S,. may "take such action as he deems necessary to 
adjust imports of such article to a level that will not 
threaten to impair the national securityo 1128 This provision 
resembles the escape clause procedure, but avoids the investi-
gation by the U. So Tariff Commission; even commissioners 
with protectionist sympathies had found many past complaints 
to,tally unwarrantedo Through the national security provision, 
protectionist interests hoped to see their complaints 
decided on political grounds instead of the economic facts 
of each case. 
The 1955 Act also expanded the scope of the escape 
clause. In section 6(a) a new paragraph was added which 
changed the section 7(b) of the 1951 Acta This new para-
graph read as follows: 
Increased imports, either act~al or relative, 
shall be considered as the cause or threat of 
serious inju.ry to th.e domestic industry pro-
ducing like or directly competitive products 
when the Commission, finds that such increased 
imports have contributed substantially towards 
causing o29threatening serious injury to su,ch industry. · 
(My emphasiso) 
This newly-added paragraph indeed blurred the caus.al 
relationship between imports and serious injurye If the 
Tariff Commission found that increased imports had contributed 
28The United States Statutes at Large, 84th CongQ, 
1 st Se s s o , 1 9 5 5 , Vo 1 0 LXIX, p ., 1 5 6 .. 
29Ibido, Po 166., 
II substantially" to causing serious injury to a domestic 
industry, it could no longer avoid a finding of serious 
injury though the chief cause of the injury may well have 
been a change in consumer tastes, or in technological 
development. 
The second major amendment of the escape clause pro-
cedures in the 1955 Act occurred in Section 6(b); for the 
first time, the term "domestic industry" was defined as 
follows: 
• G. domestic industry producing like or 
directly competitive articles means that 
portion or subdivision of the producing 
organizations manufacturing, assembling, 
processing, extracting, growing, or other-
wise producing like or directly competitive 
products or articles in commercial quantities.JO 
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It directed the Tariff Commission that in applying the above 
definition of domestic industry, the Commission should 
"distinguish or separate the operation of' the producing 
organizations" of' the directly competitive articles 11 from 
the operations of such organizations 11 producing other 
products or articles.. This is the so-called '' cherry 
amendment. 11 
As a result of this directive, .the Tariff Commission 
had to confine its investigation to that part of the 
operations of a multi-product firm which produced the product 
causing the complaint. Profit, sales, employment, labor 
cost and other economic conditions relating to the total 
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position of the same firm were to be disregardedo It was 
possible under this provision to announce a new profit record 
for the firm and still receive protection for some items. 
The segmentation of an industry for the. purpose of. evaluating 
possible injury materially expanded the scope of the escape 
clause. 
Another restrictive amendment in the· 1955 Act concerning 
the escape clause procedure was the reduction of time allowed 
to the Tariff Commission in making recommendations to the 
President after its.finding of serious injury. The section 
5 of the 1955 Act reads as follows: "The Tariff Commission 
shall immediatel;y make public its findings and recommen- ; 
dations to the President .,. 11 31 (my emphasis)o There.was no 
such word as "immediately" in section 7 of the 1951 Act. 
These restrictions to the presidential authority were so 
severe that President Eisenhower aslced in 1958 to extend the 
Trade Agreements Act for five years and to increase the 
presidential authority both in reducing and raising duty 
rateso However, due to a minor recession, the protectionist 
forces were preponderant in Congresso Their approach is 
vividly illustrated by Representative Bailey in his comments 
at a committee hearing. He said, 
Q•• The present time, with a sagging national 
economy and six million men and women unemployed, 
is not the t-ime even to seriously consider 
extending our trade act for another five 
years. .. .... It became clear that the President 
paid little attention to the Tariff Cornni.ission 
and, therefore, to Congress, Congress might 
as well not have bothered to legislate o · ·. 
eoe l, together with other members, have 
introduced legislation designed to restore 32 
the power of Congress over tariffs and trade. 
The Trade Agreements Act of 1958 extended the law for 
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a four-year period, the longest extension in the history of 
the Trade Agreements Program, and it provided a slight 
increase in the. President's authority' to reduce tariff as 
compared with the 1955 extension (from 1-5. per cent to 20 per 
cent in the whole period and five per cent to ten per cent 
in any one year). The Act, nevertheless, added· so many 
restrictive amendments to the pe~il point, escape clause, 
and national security provisions that it indeed contra-
dieted the basic purpose and spirit of the original legis-
lation. Hawkins and Norwood called the final product 
t1a bewildering maze of contradictions and cross pu:c:poses .. 11 33 
As far as the escape clause provision is.concerned, 
the Act of 1958 further restricted the President in two 
ways: it provided for the imposition of higher duties and 
it permitted Congres~ to override the decision of the 
President. 
· · 32u. Se Congress, House Com.mi t_tee on Ways and Means, 
J!earings .2E: Renewal of Trade ..f!.greements .!£!, 85th Congo, 
2nd Sess .. , Pt., 1, 1958", pp .. 2135-2137 o ·· 
33Harry Co Hawkins and Janet L .. Norwood, "The 
Legislative Basis of United States Commercial Policy, 11 
in William B .. Kelley,·Jro, ed .. Studies in United States 
Commercial Policy ( Chapel Hill, N. c~·: The University 
of North Carolina Press, 1963), P• 114 .. ';: 
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The 1958 Act permitted increases up to 50 per cent of 
the rates in effect on July 19 1934; this signified a return 
to the rates of the Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act of 1930, which 
contained the highest rates in the U. So history .. · The 
previous limit of increases was 50 per cent of the rates in 
effect on January 1, 1945, which were generally lower than 
those of 1934. Besides, duty-free products under the 1958 
Act could be transferred to dutiable categories with a levy 
of up to 50 per cent ad valorem. Before -:this amendment, no 
product could be transferred from duty-free to dutiable 
statuso 
The new law also permitted Congress to override a 
presidential veto of the Tariff Commission's findings within 
60 days of the presidential decision. In this event, the 
President shall within 15 days render the escape clause 
relief to the domestic industryo 
The escape clause, which at first had started as a 
harmless concession to protectionist interests, had grown 
with every extension until it became so powerful as to 
cancel most of the special powers granted to the President 
by the lawo Congress told the administrators how to investi·= 
gate, how much time they could take, how to interpret the 
evidence, and finally they could override the conclusions 
if a two-third majority did not like the action of the 
administrationo 
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The Escape Clause in the Trade Expansion Act 
The Kennedy administration faced the expiration of its 
authority to negotiate presidential agreements. in 19620 
After careful study of the history of the law, .. it concluded 
that the trade agreements system with its innumerable re-
strictions had lost its usefulnesso It introduced therefore 
a request for new authority which became the Trade Expansion 
Act of 19620 The main weapon of the Trade Expansion Act of 
1962 was a grant of authority to reduce all tariffs (with 
exceptions) across the board by the same percentage for equal 
concessions by other nationso The protectionist opposition 
was able to maintain an escape clause in the law together 
with some other restrictive devices. 
The new escape clause was comparable to the prior 
' 1, 
device in name only. Kennedy had :fought personally to 
prevent the new presidential authority from being crippled 
by congressional restrictionsa Therefore, both the decisions. 
concerning investigative methods arid the relief appropriate 
to the findings we;re returneg..to the judgement of the 
executive departmenta Specifically, the restrictive defi-
nition of section 6(b) in the old law concerning the extent 
of an injured domestic industry failed to appear·. in the new 
lawo Competitive imports, however, were more broadly defined 
in the new law to include ''articles at an earlier or later 
stage of processingou34 In view of the built-in lack of 
34The United States Statutes at Large, 87th c,onga, 
2nd Ses"s:'"';" Volo LXXVI, 1962, p. 9030 
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effectiveness of the escape clause this concession to the 
protectionists was more apparent than real. 
The main weakness of the escape clause from the pro-
tectionist viewpoint was, however, the requirement in 
section 301 that a tariff reduction must be the cause of 
injury to domestic industry and this causal effect must be 
proven before serious injury can be found .. To prove serious 
injury is difficult, to show the cause of it is seldom 
possible. This point can be clarified by a two-fold causal 
relation specified in the law .. 
The 1962 Act required,. first of all, the presence of 
causation between tariff concession and increased imports\ 
before any relief action could be considereda In contrast 
to the wording "in whole or in part" in the previous law, it 
stated that increased imports must be 11 a result in major 
part of concessions. 11 35 If, for example, the increased 
imports were mainly the result of the change in consumer's 
tastes, as in the Canadian Whisk.eycase, there would be no 
justification for any escape clause action even if the 
domestic industry had been seriously injured .. 
In addition to the emphasis of the causal relationship 
between concession and increased imports, the new law also 
tightened the connection between increased imports and 
.. 
serious injury .. When increased imports were found to 11 have 
contributed substantially towards causing or threatening 
35~., p. 884. 
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serious injury before, 11 then, the domestic industry could be 
considered sufficiently hurt to justify relief action. The 
term "contributed substantially" was indeed vague and loose 
and could be interpreted in a very restrictive senseo 
In the 1962 Act, "contributed substantially" was omitted 
and replaced by the wording that the increased imports had 
to "have been the major factor in causing or threatening to 
cause" serious injuryo3 6 This requirement further contracted 
the scope of ·the escape clause o For example, in the third 
investigation of the hatter's fur case, the Tariff Commission 
concluded that although the increased imports of hatter's 
fur was II in major part 11 a result of tariff concessions, the 
increased imports were nevertheless not the "major factor" 
in causing serious injury to the domestic hatter's fur 
industrya The trouble in that industry was mainly caused by 
a decline in the demand for hatter 1 s fur, which in turn was 
due to the increased practice of 11 hatlessness .. 11 
Aside from this causation between increased imports and 
serious injury, the increased imports under the new ·1962 Act 
had to be an absolute increase, not merely a relative per-
centage increaseo Under prior legislation, the increased 
imports could be 11 actual or relative .. 11 The 1962 Act omitted 
this phrase ru1.d consequently made the escape clause action 
more difficult to obtainc 
The determination of serious injury was left largely 
to the judgement of the Tariff Commission in lieu of the 
detailed requirements of the earlier lawo A·comparison of 
the relevant parts of the two J,.aws will show clearly the 
'difference. The 1951 Act contained the passage quoted on 
page 17. The 1962 law reads as follows: 
The Tariff Commission shall take into account 
all economic factors which it considers 
relevant, including idling of productive 
facilities, inability of operation at a 
reasonable profit~ and unemployment or 
underemployment.31 . 
The difference in the two approaches is obviousa 
Should the Tariff Commission find serious injury and 
recommend relief, the President under the 1962 Act may 
provide relief through tariff adjustment, which included 
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measures similar to the previous legislation, or provide 
relief through adjustment assistance, which was a new measure 
appearing for the first time in the 1962 Acto He also could 
combine the two measures .. 
If the tariff adjustment measure was taken, it was 
limited to a maximum of four yearso By the end of four years 
the trade restrictions would automatically be removed unless 
extended by the President. Moreover, all the escape clause 
actions taken under previous laws must be terminated not 
later than October 11, 19670 The tariff adjustment in the 
1962 Act, however, could also take the form of an "orderly 
marketing agreementou After receiving a finding of serious 
injury, the President 11 may negotiate international agreements 
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with foreign countries'' and reduce the imports which caused 
the injuryo38 This also indicated increasing authority of 
the President in tariff makingo 
If the second measur.e of relief, the adjustment 
assistance, was taken, the President could use two forms: 
assistance to firms and assistance to workers~ Under section 
302(2) of the 1962 Act, after receiving a report of the 
finding of serious injury to a particular domestic industry, 
the President may allow firms in the injured industry to 
request the Secretary of Commerce to certify their eligibility 
to apply for adjustment assistance. This adjustment as~ 
sistance may take the following forms: 1) 11 financial 
assistance; n39 2) "technical assistance; ,, 4o and 3) ntax 
assistanceo 1141 
So far as assistance to workers is concerned, the 
President may permit workers in the injured industry to ask 
the Secretary of Labor to certify their eligibility for 
ad,justment assistanceo This assistance takes three forms: 
1) "trade readjustment allowance, 11 which provides weekly 
payments for unemployed workers in the injured industry;42 
38Ibi~., Po 901. 
39see sections 314-315 of the Trade Expan.sion Act of 
1962 for detail, ~·, pp., 887-888 .. 
40see section 313 for detail, Ibid., p. 887. 
41 see section 317 for detail, ~Q, P\P· 889=:891~ 
42see sections 322-325 for detail, Ibid., pp. 892-894. 
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2) ••training,11 which retrained the adversely affected 
workers in order to enable them to be fully employed else-
where; 43 and 3) ''relocation allow_ance, 11 which assists 
financially the workers and their families in moving to 
places where they have already obtained stable employmenta 44 
The:refore, in addition to the reduced scope of the 
escape clause, the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, with the 
inclusion of.adjustment assistance, chang~d the emphasis in 
granting relief from higher tariff to 11 domestic 11 ·relief 
measures. Since the passage of the 1962 Act, no single 
'\ 
request for relief under the new escape clause has been 
successful., 
This brief surrunary of the legisla~ive history of the 
escape clause will now be followed by a discuss~on of its 
administration .. 
43see sections 326-327 for detail, Ibido, Po 8950 
44see sections 328-330 for detail, Ibida, PPo 895-8960 -
CHAPTER III 
THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ESCAPE CLAUSE 
This chapter is divided into two sections. In the first 
section, we shall review the procedure in administering the 
escape clause by following step by step its application to 
one of the more involved cases, the hatter's fur industryo 
In the second section, we shall survey the whole range of 
applications under the provisions of the escape clauseo 
The Escape Clause Investigation 
The hatter's fur industry is a good example of the 
administration of the escape clauseo It started on June 22, 
1950 1 when the Hatter's Fur Cutters Association of the 
Uo Sa A. filed an application with the Uo S. Tariff Com-
mission asking for relief from the tariff concession on 
hatter's fur, under ~l1e General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade that had become effective in 1948e Under the 
Executive Orders 9832, 10004 and 10082, the Tariff Com-
mission was required to conduct investigations of the escape 
clause cases upon "the request of the President, upon its 
own action, or upon application of any interested partya 1 
1The Trade Agreements Ext~nsion Act of 1951, as amended, 
added that the Tariff Commission would conduct an investi-· 
gation upon resolution of either House of Congress, or upon 
32 
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The Tariff Commission, after its 11 preliminary 11 investigation, 
thus, instituted a "formal 11 investigation of the hatter 1 s 
fur industry on January 5, 19510 2 The Tariff Commission 
also gave public notice of the investigation and of a public 
hearing by posting a copy of the notice at the office of the 
.Commission in Washington and at its New York Office, as well 
as by publication in the Federal R!3gist_§£,, and by an announce-
ment in the weekly Treasury ~isi~~o 
After the institution of the investigation on. hatter 0 s 
fur, paragraph 13 of the Executive Order was superceded by 
section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951; 
therefore the.Tariff Commission continued its investigation 
under the law of 1951c The investigation revealed the 
following facts about the hatter's fur industry~ 
1a Tariff con~essions had been made on imports of 
hatter 0 s fur: The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 
1930 specified a rate of duty of 35 per cent 
ad valorem on hatter 0 s :fur .. The rate was reduced 
to 27! per cent ad valorem in the trade agreement 
resolution of either the Senate .. Finance Cammi ttee or House 
Ways and Means Committee o . ~I1he Trade Expansion Act of 196~: 
omitted the resolution of either House of Congress" 
2Und.er the executive orders, the Tari.ff Corrimission 
instituted a 11 formaln investigation, on the application 
of an.y interested party, only if in the Corrunission° s 
judgement, there was 11 good ax1d sufficient reason therefore o 11 
The Tariff Commission might dismiss applications after 
11 preliminary 11 investigations without public hearing ai1.d with·= 
out a formal report. The Trade Agreements Extension Act of 
1951, as amended, and the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 
required that the Tariff Commission should act formf.u1y on 
al.l applicationso 
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with the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union on May 1, 
1935, and was further reduced to 15 per c.ent ad 
valorem under GATT effective January, 1948c 
2. Imports did,.in fact increase: In 1947, before 
the drop of the rate to 15 per cent, imports of 
hatter's fur.amounted to 1,862 pounds. After the 
concession, imports rose to 282 1 368 pounds in 1950" 
3a Domestic production dropped: From about 5.,9 
million pounds in 1947 to 5 .. 1 million pounds in 
19500 
4. Employment showed a downward trend: In 1939 there 
were 2,082 workers employed in the hatter's fur 
industry, in 1950 there were only 9500 
5.. Prices followed a downward trend: Price of "Grey 
Entire 11 fur was $50 75 per pound in 1946, .it was 
$2000 in 19500 
6Q Wages showed a downward trend as compared to other 
manufacturing industries: In 1939, the average 
hourly wage in the hatter 1 s fur industry was 
53 cents, 12 cents lower thru1. that for all manu-
facturing industries" In June, 1951, the rate in 
the hatter 0 s fur industry was 95 cents 1 75 cents 
lower thaJ.1 the average of $1 .. 60 in all manu-
facturing industries" 
7.. Most of the firms in the hatter's fur industry 
operated at a loss and there had been a number of 
failures of concern in the industry since 1948. 
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The Tariff Commission, therefore, unanimously concluded 
in November, 1951, that the hatterus fur industry was 
seriously injured by the tariff concession. The Commission 
was required to report to the President its findings and 
recommendations to prevent further injury to t:b.e domestic 
industryo On November 9, 1951, it recommended a rate of 
duty on hatter's fur of 47! cents per pound; this rate should 
be not less than 15 per cent or more than 35 per cent ad 
valorem, a level considered "necessary to prevent the con-
tinuation of such serious injury to the do,mestic industry .. n3 
The President, upon receipt of the report, may in the 
public interest accept or reject the Tariff Commission°s 
findi:nge Should he accept, he issues a proclamation which 
puts the Comm.ission°s recommendation into effect or proclaims 
some other relief measureso A rejection of the Tariff Com-
mission0s :f'indings obligates the President to inform, within 
60 days, the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate 
Committee on Financeo In the hatter 0 s fur case, President 
Truman accepted the Tariff Commission 1 s recommendation and, 
by Proclamation No" 2960 of January 5, 1952, increased the 
tariff On hatter 0 s fura 
The withdrawal of a tariff concession through the 
invooation of the escape clause was supposed to remain in 
effect only 11 for the time necessary to remedy" the injurya 
3uo So Tariff Commission, Hatter 1 s E.11£, li,evor! .12, ~ 
.E,:resident .£:£ the Esca:12e.'..'"'Clause Investigati~q,_:9;, ~ ~1,1...9l.2f-
Proclamati~~ bz the~, report UOo 178, 2nd Sera, 
Tvvashi.ngton, 195°3T,"' p,. 2~ 
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Therefore, paragraph 1 of the Executive Order 10401 directed 
the Tariff Commission to report at least once a year to the 
President on the changes of economic conditions of the 
domestic industrya Paragraph 2 of the same order provided 
that the Tariff Conunission shall conduct a formal investi-
gation to determine if the suspension of the tariff con= 
cessions remained necessaryo 
The Tariff Commission made, therefore, four annual 
review reports to the President on hatteru s ±~ur during the 
period 1954 through 19570 4 In each of these reports, the 
Commission. concluded that the "conditions of competition 
with respect to the trade in imported and domestic hatter 1 s 
fur had not changed sufficiently to warrant the institution 
of a formal investigation" under the paragraph 2 of the 
Executive Order 104010 However, in 1958, after a review of 
the market developments during the preceding years, the 
Ta:r.·;iff Commission instituted a form.al investigation of 
hatterus fur and came to the following conclusion" The 
overriding :fact in the fur=felt hat industry during the 
period Ur.\.der consideration was the sharp drop of consumer 
demand for the industry 1 s products caused primarily by a 
change in fashiono This marked chru'lge led to a decli.ne in 
domestic production of hattervs fur after 1953, amounting 
to only 2o7 million pounds in 'l957o It had remained at 
4see Uo So Tariff Commission, Hatter 0 s Fur, Report to 
the President Under Executive prde.£10401 (Washington~ 1954~ 
1~J;5 ~1956 aria 1951) .. 
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about five million pounds from 1950 to 19530 The imports of 
hatter's fur also declined during this same period both 
absolutely and relativelyo 
Since the trouble of the hatter 1 s fur industry was 
caused mainly by the decline in the total consumption, which 
amounted to only 208 million pounds in 1957, the Tariff 
Commission recommended to the President, on June 26, 1958, 
that 11 the original concession granted in the General Agree-
ment be restored in full o 11 5 The President accepted the 
Commission's recommendation, and on August 14, 1958, by 
Proclamation Noo 3255, he terminated the modification of the 
tariff concession, and thus restored the duty on hatter 0 s 
fur to 15 per cent ad valorem~ 
After the restoration of the tariff concession on 
hatter 9 s fur, the Hatter's Fur Cutters Association of the 
Ua S .. Ao, on June 1, 1960, applied again for escape clause 
relief~ Since neither the e:x:ecutive orders nor the trade 
legislation sets any limit with regard to the number of 
applications by a. particular industry, the Tariff Commission 
instituted the second investigation of the hatter 0 s fur 
industry on J'une 21 , 1960" 
In this second investigation of hatter 0 s fur, the 
Tarjff Com.mission had made the following findings~ 1) in 
1959, total domestic production of hatterus fur was larger 
5uo S., Tariff Commission, Hatter~.§. E, Repo;:1 to~ 
Pres:iden! 2!! Investigation~" 2 Under Paragra)h _g .91 
Executive Order 10401, (Washington, June, 1958 , p., 4., 
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than in a:ny year since 1956; 2) the number of employees in 
the hatter's fur industry was greater in 1959 than any year 
since 1956; 3) average hourly wages increased during the 
period from 1956 to 1960; 4) the pri.ces of hatter's fur rose 
i.n 1960; 5) the profit position of the industry in 1959 was 
substantially better than in any year si.nce 1956; 6) only 
about four per cent of imports in 1959 could be considered 
directly competitive with domestic production; and 7) many 
domestic producers themselves had become importers of 
hatter's furo 
The Tariff Commission, therefore, unanimously concluded 
in October, 1960, that the hatter 9 s fur industry was not 
seriously injured by the restoration of the tariff con-
cessions on hatter's fur in 1958. Under subsection (d) of 
section 7 of the 1951 Act, as amended, it was not required 
to report to the President in this case, but i.t was directed 
to make a report and publish it stating its findings and 
1 . 6 cone USJ.OnSo 
Afteir the no-injury finding, the Hatter 1 s Fur Cutters 
Association of the U .. s .. A .. filed a new application on 
tlune 4, 1962, for the determination of escape clause relief" 
The Tariff Commission then started the third investigation 
on J'm1e 22, 1962.. The investigation was still conducted 
6see U .. s .. Tariff Commission~ Hatter's~, li.§Po!...:!:. £!!. 
!_scape-91aus_£ Investigation ]:£., 7-89 Under th2. ~.!:~ 
2..f Sec.1~2B 7 2.f ~ Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, 
As .Amended, (Washington, 19bO)G - --·-·---
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1.u1der section 7 of the Trade Agreements Act of 1951, as 
amendedo When the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 became 
effective, the Tariff Commission, in conformity w:ith the pro-
vision o.f section 257 ( e) ( 3) of. the Act of · 1962, continued the 
investigation of hatter's fur under section J01(b) of the 
1962 Acto 
The third investigation of the hatter.' s fur industry was 
completed on March 13, 19630 It found that t~e im:port~ of 
hatter's fur had been increasing from 180,000 pounds in 
1960 to 240,000 pounds in 1962. But the increased imports, 
though partly due to the restoration of the tariff concession, 
consisted mainly of low-grade fur which was used by U& So hat 
manufacturers more than before as a result of technological 
developments in blending and shrinking which improved the 
quality of low-priced hatter's furo 
The Tariff Commission concluded that the increased 
imports were not the 11major factor" threatening serious 
injury to the hatter's fur industry. The trouble of the 
hatter 1 s fur industry was the decline in consumption of 
hatter's fur due to the increasing practice of hatlessness 
and to the use of other materials in making hatso Since .the 
increased imports were not the major factor .in causing 
serious injury, under the provisions of section 301(b) of 
the Trade Expansion Act, the Commission did not need to 
consider whether .the increased imports of.hatter 9 sfur were 
"in major part 11 a result of the tariff concession on hatter 0 s 
fur .. Escape clause (ioe .. tariff adjustment under section 
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301(b)) relief was not applicable and the Tariff Commission 
unanimously voted against the invocation of the escape clause .. 
This review of the escape clause investigations of 
hatter's fur illustrates the actual practice of its adminis-
tration. The results of all the escape clause investigations 
up to June, 1966, will now be summarized. 
Summary o·f the Results of .the Escape 
Clause Investigation 
Although an escape clause was included in the trade 
agreement with Mexico in 1942, it was not until April 20, 
1948, before the Tariff Commission received the first. appli-
cation for relief under the escape clause .. This first case 
·was the Marrons Case. The Tariff Commission dismissed the 
application· after "preliminary".,investigation without filing 
a formal report. From 1948 to 1951, the Tariff _Commission 
:reeei ved 16 applications under the escape clause; one of 
them was dismissed at the applicant 0 s requeste The Com-
mission dismissed 13 of them after npreliminary 11 investi-
gationso It instituted two "formal" investigations and 
found no serious injury in one case, and serious injury in 
another.. The President invoked the escape clause as recom-
mended by the Tariff Commission in this one case of women°s 
fur felt hats and hat bodies .. 
Under the T~ade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 the 
Tariff·Commission initiated 118 investigations between the 
' 
period of June, 1951, and October, 1962 .. The outcome of 
4 ·1 
these 118 investigations is summarized in Table I. 
In nine cases, the Tariff Commission terminated investi-
gations without any formal findings. The reasons for these 
terminations were lack of information from domestic pro-
ducers to permit determination of serious injury; this was 
true in the toyo cloth caps case; 7 or the impracticability 
to treat the products involved as separate industries, such 
as in the tennis rackets case 98 or both, such as the case of 
galvanized fencing wire and galvanized wire fencing09 
From Table I, we can also see that the Tariff Com.mission 
sent forty reports (those investigations in which the vote 
of the Commission was evenly divided and in favor of escape 
clause actions) to the President recommending measures the 
President might take for the relief of domestic industrieso 
The President actually invoked the escape clause only in 
14 casesa 10 He accepted the relief measures recommended by 
7see U,, Se Tariff Commission,~~~ 
B.i:~".2..::£ .. :b J 9 5,.1, (Washington, 19 5 8) , pp o 1 2~ 13. 
8u. s. Tariff Commission, J1=2rty-~FiJ:th Aru1ual ~t, 
J?isC§d.. ~ ,E~ ~-une 30., j2...6J.., (Washington~w p. 'l7 o 
9see U. s. Tariff Commission, Fort;z-~:Phi£d _!~mua,1 
JteporJ,:1 Fiscal Ie~ :£::pded ~ 30, ~' (Washington:, 1960), 
pp. 15-16 .. 
1 OThese 14 cases included hatter us fur ( 'I st investi= 
gation); dried figs; alsike clover seed (1st investigation); 
watch movements; bicycles (2nd investigation); toweling of 
flax, hemp 1 or ramie; spring clothespins (4th investigation); 
safety pins (2nd investigation); clinical thermometers; 
lead and zinc (2nd investigation); stainless-steel table 
:flatware; cotton. typewriter-ribbon cloth; sheet glass; 
and certain carpets and rugso See the next chapter for 
detail so 
TABLE I 
OUTCOME OF ESCAPE CLAUSE INVESTIGATIONS UNDER 
THE TRADE AGREEMENTS EXTENSION ACT OF 1951 
AS AMENDED JUNE 1951-0CTOBER 1962 
Investigations Instituted by the Tariff Commission •• 
Investigations Dismissed at Appljcant 9 s Request 
Investigations Terminated by the Tariff Commission 
• 0 8 
Without Formal Findings. • 0 0 0 9 
Investigations in Which the Tariff Commission 
Decided Against Escape Clause Action 0 •• 0 ••• 57 
Investigations in Which the Vote of the Tariff 
Commission Was Evenly Divided •• • 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 
Investigations in Which the Tariff Commission 
Decided in Favor of Escape Clause Action 0 0 O O 
Investigations Continued Under the Trade Expansion 
Act of 1962 0 0 0 0 O O Q o o . 4 
42 
118 
Source: U. s. Tariff Commission~ Jnvestigations Unde~ ~ ~s~al?e 
Clause £f Trade A.e;reement~ 9 15th ed. (Washington~ December~ 19631. 
43 
the Tariff Commission in nine cases and changed them to less 
restrictive provisions in five cases. 11 The increase in the 
number of successful escape clause invocations during the 
peri0d 1951-1962 can be attributed to the expanding scope of 
th~ escape clause under the Trade Agreements Act of 19510 
As of June, 1966, under section 301(b) of the 1962 Act, 
the Tariff Commission acted on nine escape clause investi-
gations (four of them first instituted under the 1951 Act) .. 
None of these nine cases led to a finding of serious injuryo 
Moreover, the vote of the Commission against findings of 
' . . . . all . 12 serious inJury was unanimous in ,._ nine cases ... 
The results of all the escape clause investigations 
are now SlJmmarized in Table II .. 
In the past, about one out of ten applications for 
escape clause relief was successfulo 13 Products of modern 
mass-production industries are conspicuously absent from this 
11 These five cases were stainless-steel table flatware, 
lead and zinc, spring clothespins, bicycles and alsike clover 
seedo 
12Under section 301(c) of the 1962 Act, which provided 
adjustment assista..'1.ce to firms and workers ru1.d had close 
relation with the escape clause provision, the Tariff Com-
mission instituted ten investigations as of June, 1966, but 
it did not find any serious injury and therefore no 
adjustment assistance was granted to either firms or 
workerso 
13For the products involved, refer to footnote ten on 
page 41 o 
TABLE II 
Sill'!MARY OF THE OUTCOME OF THE ESCAPE CLAUSE INVESTIGATIONS AS OF JUNE~ 1966. 
Legislations 
Under Executive Orders 
Under 1951 Act~ as Amended 
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*Included 8 cases in which the vote of the Tariff Commission was evenly divided. 












list. 14 More than four-fifths of the products in the 
escape clause application were non-durable goods of small 
value. They included three forest products such as softwood 
lumber and hardwood plywood; six chemical products such as 
para-arninosalicylic acid and chloride barium; eight ceramic 
products such as household china tableware, kitchen ware and 
sheet glass; nine manufactured products such as safety pins 
and spring clothespins; 11 agricultural products such as 
alsike clover seed and red fescue seed; 15 food products such 
as blue-mold cheese and canteloupe; 21 textile products 
such as knitted berets and cotton pillowcases; 24 miscel-
laneous products of minor importance such as rosaries, hops, 
pregnant mare's urine and cream of tartar. 
Important products of large value accounted for only 
about one-fifth of all the applications involved$ About 
seven products could be considered as durable goods such as 
motorcycles, and bicycles. There were eight mineral products 
such as crude petroleum and petroleum products as well as 
zinc and lead. 
Kravis and Kelly pointed out that the majority of the 
products involved in the escape clause investigations was 
nationally of minor importanceo Kravis estimated that the 
imports of the 51 products in the escape clause investigation 
14For the name of all the products, the date of their 
investigations and the vote of the Tariff Commission, see 
Appendix. Also, it is worth noting that because of multiple 
applications by one particular industry, the total number 
of products involved was 112, not 140. 
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as of the end of 1953 amounted to only about ten per cent of 
the total value of all imported products in 1951. 15 Kelly 
estimated that the imports of all the products receiving 
favorable escape clause action as of 1961 were less than 
$400 million as compared with total U@ s. imports in 1960 
of about 15,000 million. 16 
A few generalizations concerning escape clause cases 
may be possible: 1) the industries claiming the need for 
higher protection were labor-intensive; at least 33 in-
dustries can be classified in such a category ado exo hand 
blown glassware; 2) the industries were highly competitive; 
about 36 industries fit this description, such as cotton 
blouses and silk woven fabrics; 3) the industries show a 
pattern of declining output due to changes of demand or of 
technological development; about 20 industries show this 
feature such as women 1 s fur felt hats and hat bodieso 
The products involved in escape clause cases were often 
only one item of a multi-product firmo The disappearance 
of this item from the domestic output would often take place 
without noticeable impact on the market, ado exe spring 
clothespins and straight pinsc Resources could easily be 
shifted away from the depressed product; in the case of 
-------.-.-~ 
15Irving BQ Kravis, 11 The Trade Agreements Escape 
Clause, 11 American 12..9onomi£ Review, XLIV (June, 1954), 
pp O 319-33·3 0 
16william Bo Kelly, Jro, 11 The I Expanded I Trade Agree-
ments Escape Clause, 1955-61 1 " The Journal of Political 
E_cono~, LXX, Noo 1 (February, 1'%2), ppo= 37-6~ 
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agricultural products, other crops could be grown in lieu of 
garlic, or alsike clover seed. Also, the inefficiency of 
some domestic production made it advisable to replace those 
goods with imports; hand-made glass, musical instruments, 
household china tableware and kitchenware are cases in 
point., 
To sum up, the escape clause procedure was not often 
invoked for the preservation of major domestic industrieso 
One of the common difficulties in escape clause investi-
gations was the inadequacy of the data furnished by the 
applicants to determine the seriousness of their injury. In 
some cases, such as hatter's fur, the Tariff Commission 
could not obtain data for domestic production and thus had 
to resort to estimation from domestic consu.mptiono In the 
leather hand bags case, the Tariff Commission simply could 
not obtain from questionnaires any reliable information 
concerning the operations of individual producerso 
The difficulty of obtaining adequate data became 
especially clear with respect to the financial resul.ts, 
which was the most important fact in the determination of 
serious injuryo This problem was intensified in those 
cases where the products were produced by mul ti·-product 
firms as in the case of nails, spikes~ tacks, brads, and 
staples .. In some industries domestic competitors were also 
importers of the products in question.as in the case of 
watches and watch movement so In fact, the diffic1,1.lty of 
obtaining financial data accounted for all the cases where· 
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the Tariff Commission terminated its investigations without 
formal findings and accounted for some cases where the 
Tariff Commission rejected the application for an escape 
clause investigation as in the case of paper serpentineso 17 
Disagreements among the commissioners concerning the 
interpretation of the law created also much uncertaintyo 
Some commissioners preferred to use relative displacement 
of domestic production by imports as a yardstick of serious 
in;jury while other commissioners preferred to use absolute 
displacement.. ]1or example, in the first investigation of 
watches, three commissioners maintained that the share of 
the domestic market supplied by domestic producers declined 
from 80 per cent to 51 per cent and, therefore, they 
believed that this was the best evidence of serious injury~ 
But other commissioners disagreed because the absolute level 
of production, employment and sales by domestic producers 
did not decline; imported watches had apparently created 
their own marketo 
Disagreement among the commissioners often centered 
on the definition of a domestic industry. Some commissioners 
preferred to define the term domestic industry in a very 
narrow sense which excluded the general performance of other 
products in a multi-product firm and did not consider 
substitute productso Others defined the term in a broader 
sense which took into account the total performance of a 
17see Ue S .. Tariff Commission, !2£t,;z~Thi:rd Arlnua1_Rep2Et, 
Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1959 1 (Washington, 19b~PPo ·19-20: ---- ~--
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multi-product firm and included substitute productso For 
example, in the glace cherries case, three commissioners 
found that the domestic industry included not only the pro-
duction of glace' cherries, but also the production of 
maraschino cherries and other glaced fruitse But the other 
two commissioners wanted to exclude those itemsa This 
disagreement was sharply reduced after the enactment of the 
Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955 when the law required 
a narrow definition of domestic industryo 
Another point of disagreement among the commissioners 
focused on the question, "Are imported commodities like or 
directly competitive with domestic products?'' For example, 
in the motorcycles case, three commissioners maintained that 
the imported light-weight motorcycles for recreational use 
were not like or directly competitive with the domestic 
heavy-weight motorcycles for police and business uses, and 
therefore domestic produce:rs could not be considered injured 
seriously by non-~competing imports a Yet, the other two 
commissioners 'believed that all motorcycles are directly 
competitive with each othero 
The selection of the appropriate base period can also 
lead to disagreementso Injury depends on a comparison of 
the health of the industry at two different datesa Some 
commissioners frequently took a prewar period as the base 
for comparison because they were of the opinion that the 
prewar period was most representative of normal conditions 
of domestic producers. Others preferred to use post-,war 
50 
years as the base period. This difference in base period 
led to different results since the production in many in-
dustries immed;iately following the war was higher than before 
the war. In the hand-blown glassware case, for instance, 
three com.missioners considered the prewar period from 1935 
to 1938 as the base period while the other three chose the 
post-war year of 19460 
The commissioners also disagreed in the question of 
whether domestic producers should be preserved in their 
existing patterns of production, in the question of how to 
decide that increased imports contributed 11 substantiallyu 
to serious injury, as well as in the meaning of 11 threat 11 of 
serious injury and in the relief measures taken after 
affirmative findings. Of all the 108 escape clause cases 
for which the Tariff Commission concluded investigations as 
of June, 1966, only 31 cases received the unanimous vote of 
the Tariff Commission& 
These disagreements resulted to some extent from the 
different political views of the individual commissionersa 
According to Kelly, the voting records of.the com.missioners 
suggest partisanshipe The proportion of the escape clause 
cases in which the co.nmissioners found serious injury varies 
between 19 per cent and 93 per cento Based on Kelly's data, 
we find that the percentage of injury findings by six 
Democratic commissioners who participated in the voting of 
94 escape clause cases was 2508 while six Republican com-
missioners who participated in the voting of the same cases 
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found it in 54.3 per cent. 18 
Even without the differences in political beliefs and 
trade views among the commissioners, disagreements in 
applying the escape clause were inevitable. As Kelly pointed 
out, 11 There is too wide a margin for honest disagreement in 
regard to the meaning of such concepts as 'serious injury,• 
I the domestic industry' ~ •• no matter how they are defined .. " 19 
Therefore 1 disagreements among the commissioners in the 
applica·tion of the escape clause were indeed the hardest 
issues and created major problems in the administration of 
the escape clause. 
Administrative problems of the escape clause could also 
arise after the question of invocation was decidedo In 
those cases where the escape clause was not invoked, domestic 
producers expressed their dissatisfaction and made repeated 
applications for escape action. As of June, 1966, two 
industries had asked for four investigations; five industries 
applied for three investigations; and 14 industries twiceo 
Whenever the Tariff Commission refused to investigate, the 
domestic producers could file a complaint asking the court 
to order the Tariff Commission to make an investigation as 
in the barbed wire case. 20 
18william B .. Kelly, Jr., Po 50 .. 
19Williarn Be Kelly, Jr .. , Po 49. 
20see U. So Tariff Commission, Forty-Fourth Annual. 
Report, Fiscal~ Ended~ lQ, 1950, {Washington, 1961)y 
p .. 19.. . 
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In those cases where the escape clause was invoked, the 
problem of making compensatory concessions to other countries 
arose. When the Uo S .. withdraws or modifies the tariff con-
cession due to escape clause invocation, under Article XXVIII 
of the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, the U. s. is 
required to grand "substantially equivalent 0 concessions to 
the contracting countries to compensate for their loss in 
tariff benefitso 21 Although the separate statistical data 
of the value of compensatory concessions for all the 15 U. So 
escape clause actions is not available, it is believed that 
the Uo S .. had granted compensatory concessions to foreign 
countries with about equivalent value of what it was 
withdrawing., 22 
However, compensatory concessions might not be easily 
made, and might not satisfy foreign countries even when they 
were made. For example, in the spring clothespins case, 
21 see United States Statutes.§:..! Large, 80th Cong., 
1st Sess<l, Vol .. LXI, Pt .. 5, 1947, pp .. A71-A72 .. 
22The reason for not being able to obtain separate data 
of the value of the compensatory concessions was that in the 
Tariff Commission's report, the compensatory concessions 
were mingled with those U. s .. concessions that were in ex-
change for concessions obtained from other countries, or 
were under the national security provision and Agricultural 
Adjustment Aoto But sometimes, the Tariff Commission did 
publish·figures for compensatory concessions. For example, 
in 1955, the u. s. granted $8.2 million of compensatory con-
cession to Switzerland for the escape action on watch move-
ments (see U. s. Tariff Commission, Operation of~ Trade 
Agreements Program, Eighth Report, 1956, p. 172) and in 
1962, the u .. s.·granted $21 million to all contracting 
countries to compensate for the withdrawal of tariff con-
cessions on sheet glass and certain carpets and rugs (see 
U. So Tariff Commission, Operation .9! ~ Trade J1greements 
Pr?gram, 15th Report, 1965, Po 62)o 
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Sweden, Denmark and Belgium complained about the Uo So action 
and had to resort to appoint a panel to settle the issues; 23 
in the lead $.nd zinc case, Peru showed its strong dis-
satisfaction .. 24 Moreover, the invocation of the escape 
clause caused retaliatory actions in foreign countries in 
some cases. In the dried figs case, Turkey and Greece 
raised tariffs on certain u. S .. products immediately fol-
lowing the U .. s .. escape clause action on dried figs .. 25 
The invocation of the escape clause may help one 
domestic industry, but another domestic industry will be 
injured when it becomes the target of retaliatory action,, 26 
23see U .. S6 Tariff Commission, Operation of the Trade 
~gr~~.8en.t?.. Jlrogrf:£1).;, 11 t!); Repor~, (Washington, 19 5~ pp .. 4 -49 Q 
24rt was said that, in Peru, strikes, anti-Uo So 
demonstration and other lawless acts had direct relation 
with the U .. s .. establishment of absolute auota on lead and 
zinc.. See ~ ~]artment of Stat.e BuJ.letin11• Jl.ol .. XX.XVIII, 
No .. 989 (Juxrn 9, ·1958), p .. 956.. ' 
25see Uo So Tariff Commission, 9£e_E,ation 2.f the .'.£.r..§-q,§1 
!_gref6e:.D.ts R.f'ogram~ ~_i£hth E.~Eorj_, (Washington, 195b), · 
pp .. 1 '..)7-~168 .. 
26rn 1955, the tariff concession on bicycles was with~· 
drawn due to the escape clause actiono For compensation, 
the U .. s .. made concession on rolled glass, tennis racket 
frames 1 wool carpets and rugs, etc., Then in 1961, both 
rolled glass and tennis rackets became the objects of the 
escape clause investigation .. See U .. S,, Department of State, 
General Agreemen.~ .2£ Tariffs~ Trade: Ana~ 2.f Qnit~ 
Stat_e;.s N~<2J..i.atiOE._!?., sixtii'PE,_otocol (Incl.ud,i;ng J 
:§!" ~emen_t.:,..~.X Q_o_g_cessions, Neg_otiated .at Geneva~ Swi tze:r:,-
land, January-May, 1956, pubo 6348, commercial policy series 
1W(June-;= 195bj, p:-154, and U o So Tariff Commission, 
~ers:1.:~io:q of the.., Trade ~eem~.~!t~ Pr0.£!8!£, Ni.!}_~ ~or!, 
ingt on~ 195 7) , po 113 o 
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The economic impact of the escape clause action in the 
15 cases which were approved will be found in the next 
chapter •. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF ESCAPE 
CLAUSE APPLICATION 
In this chapter we try to answer the question whether 
or not the invocation of the escape clause has actually 
helped the benefitted industriese We shall analyze the 
economic performance of the 15 domestic industries that 
have been granted relief through the invocation of the 
escape clause.. Our investigation will examine .each industry 
separately before attempting any general conclusionso 
We first examine the domestic trend of production 
(shipment or sales), employment, wages and profit-and-loss 
experience for each industryo These data will help us 
determine the changes in the economic conditions of the 
industry., 
We shall next consider the pattern of imports& We 
compare this trend with the level of domestic consumption of 
the producto Should rising domestic sales be accompanied by 
reduced imports, we may conclude that the escape clause 
·. 
action was effective .. However, we shall not.overlook other 
factors which may have a bearing on each case .. 
If a protected industry fails to prosper in spite of a 
reduction of imports, we need to learn more about the 
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problems of the industry. If the imports did not drop after 
the escape clause, we may ask, 11 Is it possible that the 
escape clause action has not been restrictive enough?" A 
closer look at the rate of duty will be necessary in such 
case so 
Before we begin our examination of each domestic 
industry, a few explanations of the tables may be in order. 
In each table we show the data for six years (three years 
before, not necessarily in successtion, and three after the 
invocation of the escape clause) to provide clues for the 
impact of the escape clauseo The years selected depend 
partly on the available data, and partly on our belief that 
they were most representative of the trend of economic per-
formance. Data for the year when the escape clause was 
invoked are not shown in the tables because they do not 
permit a valid compairson of economic conditionso Only in 
one case have we made use of data from the year in which 
escape action occurred. Because of the differences in the 
problems of industry, the items in each table are not always 
the same" The order of industries analyzed is chronological 
and reflects the end of the investigations. 
Women's Fur Felt Hats and Hat Bodies 
In December 1 1950, the escape clause was invoked in 
the case of women's fur felt hats and hat bodies which 
resulted in an increase of the average rate of duty for all 
grades of fur hats from 42.3 per cent to 51.4 per cent 
ad valoremo Since that time until 1953, the domestic 
industry did not improve significantly .. As can be seen in 
Table III, domestic producti.on was far higher during the 
depression; though domestic production increased somewhat 
in 1951, it declined again in 1952, 19530 The wage rate 
increased slightly, but the level of employment was lower 
than before the invocationo 
Since imports remained at about the same level, it 
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could be argued that the rate of duty was probably not high 
enough to reduce imports sufficientlyo. However, the argu-
ment could be easily refuted by considering three points. 
1!1 irst 1 if we take into account the amount of imports in 1950, 
we can see that the increase in the rate of duty did have 
the effect of reducing imports" In 1950, imports amounted 
to 260,000 dozen pieces, while in 1951, it decreased to 
121. 1 000 dozenso More important is the fact that though the 
level of consumption increased somewhat between 1947 and 
'l 95 ·1, it had been declining absolutely in the long run a The 
average level of consumption was about 1,000,000 dozens from 
1935 to 1939, as compared to less than 800,000 dozens 
between 1949 and 1953. The third point is that the declining 
trend of production and employment had been taking place 
even before 1948 when the tariff concession was madeo 
Therefore, the domestic industry in question was a 
declining industry largely due to the increasing acceptance 
of "hatlessness" by women .. Just as in the case of hatter 0 s 
fur, which we had mentioned before, the tariff concession 
TABLE III 
WOMEN'S FUR FELT HATS AND HAT BODIES 
Years Before Invocation After Invocation 
Economic Conditions 1937 1948 1949 1951 1952 1953 
Rate of Duty or Ad Valorem Equivalent (percent) (1) noao 42.3a noao 5L4a 5l.4a 5l.4a 
Domestic Consumption (1,000 dozens) (2) 1,128 674 687 889 868 874 
Domestic Production (1,000 dozens) (3) 1,076 629 566 768 753 743 
Imports (1,000 dozens) (4) 52 45 121 121 116 131 
Ratio of Import to Consumption (percent) (5) 4.6 6 .. 7 17.6 13.6 13.2' 15o0 
Employment (no. of workers) b (6) 5,901 4,349 3,717 3,560 3,340 3,700 
Average Hourly Wage (dollars) (7) noao n.a. 1.70° L75 1.83 1..87 
aEstimated average for all grades of fur hats. 
bThe number shown also included the workers engaged in the production of men's fur felt hats. 
c Estimated. 
Sourcesg Row (1)~ u.· s. Tariff Commission, Women's Fur Felt Hats~ Hat Bodies, Report to the 
President (1953) Under Executive Order 10401 (Washington, 1953'Y;-Tb. l~ po lOo Rows (2), (3),--C4~(5), 
U.S. Tariff Commission~ Women°s Fur Felt Hats~ Hat Bodies, Report to~ President (1954) Under 
Executive~ 10401 (Washington~ 1954)~ Tb. 3, p. 12. Row (6) before invocation, _U. s. Tariff Commission, 
Women 1 s Fur Felt Hats~~ Bodies, Report!.£ ~·President£!!,,~ Escape Clause Investigation, With Appen-
.!!!! ==Proclamation~ the President~ Rep. No. 170, 2nd ser. (Washington, 1951), Tb. 7, Po 18. Ro;--{'6) after 




on '.Nomen' s fur t'el t hats and hat bodies would probably be 
restored by a presidential proclamation. The restoration did 
not take the form of presidential proclamation, however. 
Due to a litigation in which the U, So Customs Court sus--
tained importers' contentions, the escape clause action has 
been practically nullified since 1955. 1 
Hatter's Fur 
We discussed the hatter's fur case in detail in the 
first section of Chapter II as we explained the procedures 
of an escape clause investigation. We had seen that the 
trouble of this industry stemmed essentially from the fact 
that the consumption of hatter's fur declined absolutely 
because of the increasing acceptance of 11 hatlessness 9' by the 
general public. We found that the escape clause action in 
this case did not help the domestic industryo Table IV 
further indicates the declining trend of the industry 0 s 
economic condition, while at the same time imports were 
reduced substantiallyo 
Dried Figs 
The escape clause was invoked in August, 1952, which 
increased the duty from 2} cents per pound to 4} cents per 
pound on the importation of dried figs. From 1952 until 
1960, the economic situation of the domestic dried figs 
1 See Uo So Tariff Commission, Thirt;:[_-Ninth Annual 
Repo:iz_!, (Washington, 1955), p. 130 
TABLE IV 
HATTER 9S FUR 
Years Before Invocation After Invocation 
Economic Conditions 1939 1950 1951 1953 1955 1957 
Rate of Duty or Ad Valorem Equivalent (percent) (1) 27! 15 15 17.4 17o4 noao 
Domestic Consumption (1,000 pounds) (2) 7.,970 5,437 5,368 5,264 3,803 2,763 
Domestic Production (1,000 pounds) (3) 7,930 5.,155 5,121 5,016 3,644 2,688 
Imports (1,000 pounds) (4) 40 282 247 248 159 95 
Ratio of Imports to Consumption (percent) (5) 0.5 5o2 4.6 4.7 4.3 3.4 
&plo;yment (6) 2'jo82 950 750 n.a •.. 555 n.a. 
Average Hourly Wage (dollars) (7) 0 53 n.a. 1.02 n.a. L50 lo48 
Unit Value (per pound, dollars) (8) 1.33 1.35 2.75 2.68 3o35 3.35 
Sources: Row (1), U.S. Tariff Commission, Hatter's Fui;,, Retort to~ President (1957) Under Execu-
~ Order 10401, (Washington, 1957), p. 19 p. 9. Rows (2)-;-T3), 4), (5), 1939 figures, U. s. Tariff 
Commission, Hatter's Fur, Report to the President 2E: the Escape-Clause Investigation, With Appendix --
Proclamation !2z the President 9 Rep. No. 178, 2nd ser."lwashington, 1953), Tb. 1, p. 10. Rows (6), (7) 
before invocation, Ibid., p. 12 •. Row (8), 1939 figure, Ibid., Tb. 3, p. 16. Rows (2), (3), (4), (5), since 
1950~ U.S. Ta.riff Commission, Hatter 9 s FurQ Report~~ President .2!! Investigation No. g Under Paragraph 
g of Executive Order 10401 (Washington, 1958), Tb. 1, p. 13. Row (6), (7) 1 1955 figure, 1957 Report, p. 6. 




producers has not improved. Domestic production in 1960 was 
about half of that in 1947. Average prices to growers did 
not increase until 1960. While domestic production declined, 
imports of dried figs continuously increased. Therefore, it 
could be argued that the additional protection of domestic 
producers was not sufficient and that the escape clause 
action should have been more restrictive. This argument, 
however, will not stand up if we consider the real cause of 
declining production in this industryc 
The decline in domestic dried figs production occurred 
even before the tariff concession was made., This was mainly 
the result of a steady decrease of the fig-bearing acreage 
in California, which in turn was the consequence of in-
creasing urbanization. 2 When the price of the land used for 
fig production rose to a point where it was more profitable 
to shift it to home development, it could be expected that 
fig producers would sell out .. Under the circumstances, the 
replacement of domestic production by imports would be a 
natural consequence., Therefore, there is really no statis= 
tical relationship between tariff con.cessions and total 
domestic production. The difficulties of this domestic 
industry cannot be overcome by escape clause action .. 
2The five-year average from 1936-1940 was 36,638 acresa 
In 1962, there were only 20,000 acres, representing a 
decrease of almost one-half., See U o S. Tariff Commission, 
Figs, Dried, Report to the President (1962) Under Executive 
Order 10401, (Washington, 1962), TbG 2, p .. 19 .. 
Years 
Economic Conditions 
Rate of Duty or Ad Valorem Equivalent (percent) 
Total Supply (1 1 000 pounds)b 
Domestic Production (1,000 pounds) 
Imports (ljOOO pounds)c 
Ratio of Imports to Supply (percent) 




1947 1949 1951 
(1) n.ao n.ao 2L6a 
(2) 63,093 48,347 54,844 
(3) 61,200 45,400 469800 
(4) 3,054 4,817 9.,265 
(5) 4.8 10.0 1609 
(6) 6.15 8.50 9.80 
After Invocation 
1953 1956 1960 
lloao 38.8a n.a. 
57,966 67,213 66,713 
37,280 40,960 31,800 
12,815 14,949 31,475 
22ol 22.2 47 .. 2 
7 .. 80 6.95 llo50 
a Based on 1955 value of imports of dried figs valued at 7 cents or more per pound. 
bEquivalent to carry=in plus domestic production plus imports minus exportso 
c Includes fig paste. 
Sources~ Row (1), U.S. Tariff Commission, Fig(, :Q!'ied, ReJort to the President (1956) Under Executive 
Order 10401 (Washington, 1956) 9 Tb. 2, p. 18. Rows 2), (3), (4, (5r,=before invocation, Ibid., Tb .. 3, p .. 19. 
Row (6), before invocation9 Ibid.~ Tb. 12, p. 28. Rows (2)~ (3), (4), (5) 7 after invocation, Uo s .. Tariff 
Commission, Figs 9 D.ried 9 Repo~ 12, ~ President (1962) Under Executive Order 10401 (Washington 9 1962), 




.Alsike Clover Seed 
The escape clause was invoked in June, 1954, when the 
President established a tariff quota of 1.5 million poundso 
Within the quota, the import duty was two cents per pound, 
in excess of the quota, six cents per pound. 
increased to three million pounds in 1.957. 
The quota was 
Si.nee the 
establishment of a tariff quota, economic conditions of the 
producers have not been improvedo Domestic production 
continued to decreaseo Average price to the grower remained 
stagnanto Since imports had been dropping rapidly, it is 
easy to see the real trouble of the producers. As can be 
seen in Table VI, domestic consumption of alsike clover seed 
decreased steadily before and after the invocation of the 
escape clauseo The decrease was the result of the increasing 
use of improved varieties such as alfalfa, Ladino clover, 
birdsfoot trefoilo When demand decreases, restriction on 
imports, even in the form of a quota, could not possibly 
render much help to the producerso 
Watch Movements 
The demand for better-grade watches is characteristi-
cally very income elastico A ibmestic recession is reflected 
in a more th1;m proportionate drop in the sales of expensive 
watches, while a broad-based boom helps the jeweled-watch 
demand. On July 27, 1954, the President, by Proclamation 
Noo 3062, raised the tariff duty of watch movements on which 
tariff concessions had been granted to Switzerland in 19360 
TABLE VI 
ALSIKE CLOVER SEED 
Years Before Invocation After Invocation 
Economic Conditions 1949 1951 1953 1955 1957 1959 
Rate of Duty or Ad Valorem Equivalent (percent) (1) 7.4 6.2 10.2 15.7 10.6 llo2 
Domestic Consumption (1,000 pounds) (2) 14.,115 13,094 13.,869 11,887 9,619 8,047 
Domestic Production (1~000 pounds) (3) 9,930 13,944 11.,730 9,909 11,456 6,010 
Imports (1,000 pounds) (4) 1,511 93 5,260 3,475 251 1,366 
Ratio of Imports to Consumption (percent) (5) 10.7 0.7 37.9 29.3 2.6 17.0 
Average Prices Received by Producers 
(dollars per hundred pounds) (6) 28.80 35.80 16.50 21.00 17.90 18.60 
Sources~ Row (1), U.S. Tariff Commission, Alsike Clover ~ 9 Report l2, ~President~ Escape-
Clause Investigation No. 7=103 Under the Provision .2f Section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 
1951, as Amended {'Washington, 1961), Tb. 5, p. 36. Rows (2), "[3T;' ffi, Ibid • ., Tb. 3, P• 34. Row ffi, 




Following the pattern of the economy, especially after 1959, 
the domestic watch movement industry on the whole has been 
booming. Domestic production increased from 8~5 million 
units in 1955 to 1306 million units in 1965. Net operating 
profit increased sharply from 11 s 7 million dollars in 1960 · 
to 23o9 million dollars in 1963. Ratio of net profit to net 
sales increased from 5.1 per cent in 1953 to 10.1 per cent 
i.n 1963 o The wage rate both for pin-level and jeweled-level 
watch employees increased alsoo The level of employment 
declined due to the increasing mechanization of the industry 
and to a shift in production to simpler pin-level watch 
movementso3 
The improvement of economic conditions of the watch 
movement industry cannot be attributed to the escape clause 
actione As can be seen in Table VII, the ratio of imports 
to consumption remained very much the same before and after 
the invocation; the absolute import level increased in line 
with rising consumptiono The health of the domestic industry 
was not seriously injured at this time by the increased 
quantity of imports because of its own increase in sales and 
profitso 
The most important reason for the improvement of the 
domestic industry was the substantial increase in domestic 
consumptiono It increased from 16o2 million units in 1954 
3rt took an average 3 o 1 man-hours to finish one jeweled-· 
level movement in 1963j but it took only 0.7 man~hours to 
produce one pin-level watcho 
TABLE.VII 
WATCH MOVEMENTS 
. Yeaxs Before Invocation After Invocation 
Economic Conditions 1951 1952 1953 1955 1960 1965 
Rate of Duty or Ad Valorem Equivalent {percent) (1) 33.4a · 33.4a 33.4a 48.2b 48.2b 48 b . .• 2 
Domestic Consumption (1,000 units) (2) 22,429 19,238 20,212 17,713 22,677 34,354 
Domestic Production (1,000 units) (3) 11,559 8,554 8,441 8,492 9,555 i3 600'' ' . 
Imports (1,000 units)c (4) 11,007 10,877 11,875 9,355 13,158 17,120 
Ratio of Imports to Consumption (percent) (5) 49 56 59 53 58 50 
Employment (no. of employees) (6) 19,060 20,691 23,663 17,036 12,133 13,175 
Average Hourly Wage (dollars)d (7) 1.33 1.36 1.44 1.51 1.76 n.a •. 
Shipments From U.S. Virgin Islands (1,000 units) (8) 44 3,578 
Ratio of Net Profit to Net Sale (percent) (9) 4.4 3.5 5.1 5.8 5.8 n~a.·' 
aBased on the value of imports in 1955·and computed on theaverage rates under 1936 Swiss agreement. 
bBased on the value of imports in 1955 ru,d computed on the average rates in 1956. 
cExcludes ~ipments from U.S.· Virgin Islands and Guam • 
. dFor employees producing pin-lever watches. 
Sources: Row (1), U, S. Taxiff Commission, Watch Movements; Report· to the President (1956), Under Executive 
Order 10401 (Washington, 1956) Tb. 3, p. 32. Ro;-ffi and (4), U. s .. Taxiff Comission, Watch Movements, Re~rt 12: 
the President (~. TEA-IR-4-66~ Under Section 35l(d) (!) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (Washington, 196), .· 
Tb. 3, p. 15. Row (3), except l~U. S. Tariff Commission, Watch Movements, Report to the President on 
Investigation No. TEA-IA-2 Under Section 35l(d) (2) of the Trade Exgansion Act of 1962-rwashington, 1965), Tb. 4, 
p. 48. Row (3;1965 figure, in 1966 Report, p. 5, RowT5), in 196 Reuort, p.b. Row (6), t:o. 1966 Report, Tb. 5, 
p. 17. Row (7), U, S. Tariff Commission, Watch Movements, Report to the President (1962) Under Executive Order 104ol 
(Washington, 1962), Tb. 9, p. 40. Row (8), in 1966 Report, Tb. 8, p. 20. Row (9) for 1951, 1952, in 122§ Report, · 
Tb. 15, p. 46. Row (9) for 1953, 1955, U. s. Taxiff Commission, Watch Movements, Report to the President (12.21) ~ 
Executive Order 10401 (Washington, 1957), p. 23. Row (9) for 1960, in 1965 Report, Tb. 16, p. 59. 0\ 
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to an annual average of about 26.4 million units between 
1962 and 1964, representing an increase of 63 per cent. In 
1965 domestic consumption amounted to 34.4 million units, 
which was larger than any year before the invocation of the 
escape clause. 
In addition to the increase of consumption, other 
developments also permitted the improvement of the industryQ 
Nearly all domestic producers have expanded their foreign 
facilities or acquired plants in foreign countries and in 
the Virgin Islands, a U. S. territory. 4 The Uo Se producers 
accounted for about 27 per cent of the aggregate of the 
imported watch movements in 1964. Technological progress 
has made pin-level watches more reliable and less expensive. 
Together with the rising cost of watch repairs, good watches 
have a larger market in a lower price range. Also, marketing 
innovations emphasizing style change have made sure that 
many people want to own more than one watcho 
It could probably be argued that these developments 
were directly related to the escape clause actiono However, 
the improvement of economic conditions of the domestic 
producers was mainly due to the increase of domestic con-
sumption during a period of prosperity. 
4watch and watch parts imported into the Virgin Islands 
are dutiable at six per cent ad valorem; from there they enter 
the customs territory of the Ua S. duty freeo. If they are 
directly imported into the Uo s. customs territory from 
foreign countries, they are dutiable at 30 to 50 per cent ad 
valoremo Therefore, a watch-assembly industry has beeri es= 
tablished since 1959. By the close of 1964, there were 11 
concerns assembling watches in the islands~four of them owned 
by U.S. watch producers, five by Ua s. importerso 
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Bicycles 
The weakness of the domestic bicycle industry in the 
decade after World War II can be traced to its slowness in 
accepting the concept of a lightweight product. Only after 
imports had firmly established the market for this new bike 
did the domestic producers move in the same direction. 
The escape clause was invoked in August, 1955, which 
raised the average duty of all grades of bicycles from 19G8 
per cent to 24 .. 1 per cent ad valoremo Since that ti.me the 
domestic industry remained relatively stagnant, though in 
some sense we could say that it improved a littleo The level 
of employment continued to be lower than beforeo Hourly wage 
rates remained about the same. However, both the level of 
domestic consumption and sales increased, while the level of 
imports maintained the high average which had triggered the 
escape clause actiono The increase in sales in 1958 and 1959 
was due mostly to the increase in the number of children of 
bicycle-riding ageo The industry itself reflects this slow 
growth in the demand for its products; but it is not a 
growth industryo In February, 1961, the President es-
tablished new trade agreement rates for bicycles, which are 
the same as the escape clause rateso 
Toweling of Flax, Hemp, or Ramie 
The tariff concession was withdrawn in July, 1956, which 
raised the duty from 10 per cent to 40 per cent ad valoremo 





Rate of Duty or Ad Valorem Equivalent (percent) (1) 
Domestic Consumption (1,000 bicyclBs) (2) 
Factory Sales (1,000 bicycles) b (3) 
Imports (1,000 bicycles) (4) 
Ratio of Import to Consumption (percent) (5) 
Employment (noo of workers) (6) 
Average Hourly Wage (dollars) (7) 
aEstimated average of minimum and maximum rates. 
b Production figures are not available. 
Before Invocation 
1952 1953 1954 
- - 19.8a 
2,154 2,696 2,488 
1,920 2,112 1,532 
246 593 964 
11 22 39 
noa-. 6,485 5,182 
L81 lo93 2.03 
After Invocation 
1956 1958 1959 
24.la 
2,915 2,931 3,606 
1,747 2,116 2,596 
1,173 824 1,013 
40 28 28 
2,240 2,797 3,261 
n.a. lo97 2.05 
Sources: Row (1), U. So Tariff Commission, Bicycles, Report to the President (1960) Under Executive 
Order 10401 (Washington~ 1960), p. 4. Rows (2), (3), (4), and (5), Ibido, Tbo 2, p. 19. Row (6) before 
invocation, U.S. Tariff Commission, Bicycles (1255), Repor~ to~ President 2.£ EscapemClause Investigation 
fu?.· 32 Under the Provisions of Section Z of ~ Trade Agreements Extension Act of 19..2! (Washington, 1955), 
p. 39j for 1956~ U. S.' Tariff Commission~ Bicycles, Report_:!:£ the President (195B') ~ Executive Order 
10401 (Washington~ 1958)~ po 8; for 1958 and 1959 9 ]960 Report, Po 9o Row (7) before invocation9 1955 




As can be seen in Table IX, domestic production continued to 
decline in spite of higher duty rates. This worsening of 
·the economic condition must be attributed to the decrease in 
the demand for the industry's products because imports 
declined substantially from 3.8 million pounds in 1955 to 
1.1 million pounds in 1957, while the domestic market share 
increased from 25 per cent in 1955 to 40 per cent in 1961~ 
In fact, the trend of domestic consumption of linen toweling 
has been downward since the 1930 1 so This downward trend is 
due to the increasing use of mechanical equipment for washing 
and drying dishes, as well as the increasing use of toweling 
that is made of other fibers. 
Spring Clothespins 
The tariff concession under GATT was withdrawn in 
November, 1957, and the .duty was restored to the rate of 
20 cents per grosso This 1930 rate was not nearly as 
restrictive in 1957 due to the higher price level in the 
later periodG However, in October, 1961, the Uo So Customs 
Courts held that the President's Proclamation was void 
because the President had exceeded the authority delegated 
to him by Congress with respect to the escape clause action 
and because th.e Pr~sident had no right to · suspend the 
earlier proclamationo5 The concession was restored in 19610 
The escape action from 1958 to 1960 had permitted the 
5For detail, see United States Customs Court Reports, 
Volo 47 (July-December, 1961), pp. 12_9-1370 
TABLE IX 
TOWELING OF FLA.X 9 HEMP, OR RAMIE 
Years Before Invocation After Invocation 
Economic Conditions 1953 1954 1955 1957 1959 1961 
Rate of Duty or Ad Valorem Equivalent (percent) (1} 10 10 10 40 40 40 
Domestic Consumption (million pounds)a (2) 2.5 2.5 2.5 1.2 1.2 1.2 
Domestic Production (1.,000 pollllds) (3) 676 555 634 585 456 458 
Imports (1,000 pounds) (4) 3,798 3,118 3,830 1,157 1,415 1,254 
aThe figures for individual years are not availableo The figure before invocation is the annual aver-
age from 1951 to 1955; after invocation is the annual average from 1957 to 19610 
Sources~ Row (1.) 9 U. s. Tariff Commission, Toweling 2f Flax, H)mp, 2£ Ramie, Report to the President 
(1962) Under Executive ~ 10401 (Washington., 1962), p. 3o Row (2 , Ibid., p. 7. Row (3) before 
invocation, U.S. Tariff Commission, Toweling of Flax, Hemp, Q!: Ramie, Report to the President (1958) Under 
Executive~ 10401 (Washington~ 1958)~ Tb. 4, p. 11; after invocation, in 1962 Report, Tb. 1, p. 11. 




Years Before Invocation 
Economic Conditions 1954 1955 1956 
Rate of Duty or Ad Valorem Equivalent (percerit)a (1) 25.0 24 .. 4 2308 . 
Domestic Consumption (1,000 gross) (2) 4,438 5,228 5,494 
Domestic Production (1,000 gross) (3) 3,463 3,774 3,588 
Imports (1,000 gross) (4) 1,173 1,491 1,589 
Ratio of Imports to Consumption (percent) (5) 26 29 29 
Price (dollars per gross) b (6) .897 .890 0893 
Employment (no. of workers) (7) 399 437 407 
Average Hourly Earnings (dollars) (8) 1.10 LlO 1.22 
~erived from the rate of duty per gross divided by import value per grosso 
bThis is average delivered price of wooden spring clothespins. 
c From January to September only. 
After Invocation 
1958 1959 1960 
, 50.8 51.3 52.6 
5,742 6,731 6,468 
3,96~ 4,463 4,962 
1i801 2,281 1,979 
31 34 31 
.976 .972 .959 
347 388 394 
1.28 1.30 1.35° 
Sources: Row (1), u. S. Tariff Commission, Spring Clothespins, Report i£ the President (1961) Under 
Executive Order 10401 (Washington, 1961)~ Tb. 1, p. 11 and Tb. 9, p. 19. Rows \2Y, (3), (4), and (5;;---
Ibid., Tb. 2, Po 12. Row (6)~ U.S. Tariff Commission, Spring Clothespins, Report to the President (.1960) 
~ Executive Order 10401 (Washington~ 1960), Tb. 2, p. 13. Row (7) and (8), in 1961 Report, Tbo 12, 
p. 22. 
.. -J [\J 
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domestic industry to raise its prices but it failed to in-
crease its market share. In view of continued effective 
competition from imports even the higher prices could not be 
maintained though they were slightly above those of the 
years before the invocation. The level of employment 
remained about the same as before. The main trouble of this 
industry is the relative stagnation in the demand for spring 
clothespinsQ New product developments including clothes 
dryers keep the demand for this particular product from 
rising fastero 
Safety Pins 
The concession rate of safety pins of 22.5 per cent 
ad valorem under GATT was modified to 35 per cent ad valorem 
in December, 1957, f_o_llowing a presidential proclamation on 
the escape clausee Since then the economic conditions of 
the industry had not improved. The level of production 
declined after the invocationo Factory sales prices remained 
stableo Due to the improvement in manufacturing and 
packaging techniques, employment continued to decreaseo 
The domestic safety pin industry has continued to 
stagnate in spit13 of a decline in imports. The difficulties 
of the industry appear to be caused by a decline in the 
total consumption of safety pinse The introduction of com-
petitive fasteners in many uses which were formerly reserved 
for pins indicates that safety pins may well be considered 
a declining product due to technological obsolescence. 
TABLE XI 
SAFETY PINS 
Yea.rs Before Invocation After Invocation 
Economic Conditions 1954 1955 1956 1958 1960 1961 
Rate of Duty or Ad Valorem Equivalent (percent) (1) 22.5 22.5 22.5 35 35 35 
Domestic Consumption (1,000 gross) (2) 12,539 15,888 13,828 11,019 12,149 11,863 
Domestic Production (1,000 gross) (3) 99771 10,577 9,606 7,540 7,403 8,216 
Imports (1,000 gross) (4) 2,798 4,660 4,870 3,o48 4,394 3,608 
Ratio of Imports to Consumption (percent) (5) 22.3 29.3 35.2 27.7 36.2 30.4 
Price (dollars per gross)a (6) .31 .30 .31 0 33 .37 .35 
Employment (1,000 man-hours) (7) 524 580 462 407 356 334 
Average Hourly Earnings (dollars) (8) 1.74 1.82 2.01 2.21 2.34 2.34 
-
aManufacturers' sale unit value. 
Sources~ Row (1), U.S. Tariff Commission, Safety Pins, Report to the President (1962) Under Executive 
Order 10401 and Section 35l(d) (!) of the Trade Expansion Act 2f 1962--C-Washington, 1962~. 1, p. 11. 
Rows (2)~ (4~and (5)$ Ibid., Tb. 5, p. 15. Rows (3) and (6), for 1954 and 1955, U.S. Tariff Commission, 
Safety Pins, Report to~ President .2!l Escape-Clause Investi ation No. 2,2 Under the Provisions of Section 
Z £f ~ Trade Agreements Extension !£:!2. £! 1951, as Amended Washington, 1957Y;""'Tb. 4, p. 59; for figures 
after 1956, in 1962 Report 9 Tb. 2, p. 12. Rows (7) and (8), for 1954 and 1955, in 1957 Report, Tb. 6, p. 61; 





The tariff concession on clinical thermometers under 
GATT was withdrawn in April, 1958; the rate of duty increased 
from 42! per cent to 85 per cent ad valorem. Since that 
time, especially after 1961, economic conditions of domestic 
producers h;3.ve been improvingo Sales by domestic producers 
increased, so did the level of employment. Prices declined 
after 1959, which reflected the reduction of production 
costs due to technological progresse According to the 
Uo So Tariff Commission, the stronger competitive position 
of the domestic industry was brought a.bout only in part by 
the higher level of protection. The following events must 
be taken into consideration: 1) several larger producers 
have moved toward integration; they have invested a consider~~ 
able amount of capital in new machinery and new plant and 
thus reduced cost of production; 2) there has been techno-
logical development in marking the blanks; and 3) producers 
in Japan, where virtually all imports came from have lagged 
behind in mechanization and have increased their cost of 
productiono 
Imports were not reduced by the heavy duty rateso A 
sharp rise in consumption combined with better technology 
kept this industry from falling behindo In 1964, consumption 
was greater than in any of the preceding 14 years and was 
about 30 per cent higher than in 1957, the last year before 
the invocation of the escape clauseo This substantial 
increase in domestic consumption is, therefore, the major 
TABLE XII 
CLINICAL THERMOMETERS 
Years Before Invocation After Invocation 
Economic Conditions 1955 1956 1957 1959 1961 1964 
Rate of Duty or Ad Valorem Equivalent (percent) (1) 42.5 42.5 42.5 85 85 85 
Domestic Consumption (gross) (2) 77,876 87,913 100,401 97,331 111,555 132,338 
Sales by Domestic Producers (gross) (3) 74,020 74,982 85,200 70,968 71,405 93,206 . 
Imports (gross) (4) 5,603 14,722 16,851 26,363 40,15oa 39,132a 
Ratio of Import to Consumption (percent) (5) 7.2 16.7 16.8 27.1 36.0 29.5 
Prices (dollars)b (6) 74.45 77.95 82.27 83.56 73.37 69.84 
Employment (1,000 man-hours) (7) n.a. 
Average Hourly Earnings (dollars) (8) 1.38 
Net Operating Profit (per $1 9000) (9) n.a. 
aincluded shipments from the U.S. Virgin Islands. 




1,309 1,303 1,244 1,628 
1.56 1.50 n.a. n.a. 
187 107 85 n.a. 
Sources: Row (1), U.S. Tarif'f Commission, Clinical Thermometers, Report !2, ~ President _2!!; Investiga-
~ No. TEA-IA.rm? Under Section t5l(d) (g) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (Washington, 1965), Tb. 1, 
p. 25. Rows (2)~ ~(4), and 5) before invocation, U.S. Tariff Commission, Clinical Thermometers, 
Finished 2£ Unfinished~ Report!£ the President (1960) Under Executive Order 10401 (Washington, 1960), Tb. 5, 
p. 16; after invocation, 12£2 Report, Tb. 2, p. 26. Row (6) before invocation, 1960 Report, Tb. 1, p. 12; 
after invocation, 12.§2 Report, Tb. 4, p. 28. Row (7) before invocation, U.S. Tariff Commission, Clinical 
Thermometers~ Report i£ ~President£!! Investigation NOo TEA-IA-1 Under Section 35l(d) (g) (z) of~ 
Trade Expansion Act£!. 1962 (Washington~ 1963)~ Tb. 10, p. 36; after Invocation, 1965 Report., p. 2L Row (8) 
1960 Report') Tb. 7, p. rs:- Row (9)') 1963 Report, Tb. 11, p. 37. 
-.J 
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factor that helped the industry while imports continued to 
increase after the escape clause action. 
Lead and Zinc 
The escape clause was invoked in October, 1958. The 
invocation did not change import duties. It set up an 
annual import quota which was equal to 80 per cent of the 
average annual commercial imports during the five-year 
period 1953-19570 Since the invocation domestic producers 
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of lead and zinc do not seem to be better off. The level of 
domestic production both for lead and zinc was lower than 
before. Average prices and the level of employment were 
lower also. Wage rates remained stagna~t. This stagnation 
of the domestic industry could not be a surprise if we 
consider the consumption level. As can be seen in Table XIII, 
the level of consumption remained stable while imports 
dropped greatlyo 
Stainless-Steel Table Flatware 
The escape clause was invoked on the importation of 
stainless-steel table flatware in October, 1959~ A tariff 
quota was established at the annual amount of 5.75 million 
dozen pieces. The rate of duty within the quota was not 
changed; in excess of it the rate was raised greatly, as 
can be seen in the second row of Table XIVo 
Since the establishment of the tariff quota, the 
domestic producers of this article have increased their 
Economic Conditions 
Annual Imports Quotas 






Imports (Actually imported) 
(1,000 tons) 
Ratio of Imports to Consumption 
(percent) 
Average Prices 
(cents per ton) 
Employment (no of workers in · 
mining both lead and zinc 
Average Hourly Earnings 
(dollars) 
















LEAD AND ZINC 
..; 
Before Invocation 
1955 1956 1957 
1,213 1,210 · 1,145 
1,459 1,323 1,250 
840 860 822 
819 824 783 
453 488 575 
603 729 951 
37.3 40.3 50.2 
41.3 55.1 76.1 
15.1 16.0 14.7 
12.3 13.5 11.4 
n.a •. 14,251 n.a. 
n,a •. 2.19 n.a. 
After Invocation 
1959 1960 1962 
355 355 355 
521 521 · 521 
1,091 1,021 1,110 
1,278 1,159 1,346 
707 716 681 
702 701 768 
347 355 340 
514 502 510 
31.8 34.7 30.7 
40.2 43.3 37.9 
12.2 11.9 9.6 
11.4 12.9 11.6 
8,155 7,752 7,803~ .· 
2.38 2.43 2.44a 
. Sources: Row (1), U. S. Tariff Commission, Lead~ Zinc, Report tci the President (No. TEA...;.IR-8...;.63) 
Under Section 35l(d) (1) of the Trade Expansion Act 2f 1962 (Washington, 1963), Tb. 11, p. 34. · Row (2), · 
Ibid., Tb. 12, p. 35. Rows I3)',T5T, (7) and (9J,before invocation, U.S. Tariff Commission, Lead~ 
Zinc, Report to the President 2£ Escape-Clause Investi ation No. 65 Under the Provisions 2f Section z of 
the Trade A reements Extension Act of 1951, as Amended Washington, 1958), Tb. 7, p. 125. Rows (2), (Zil", 
fil, and (10 before invocation, Ibid., Tb. 8, p. 126. Rows (3) to (10), after invocation, lg63 Report, 
Tb. 3, p. 26. Row (11), before invocation, 1958 Report, Tb. 10, p. 128; after invocation, ~ Report,., · 
Tb. 4, p. 27. Row (12) before infocation, 1958 Report, Tb. 11, p. 130; after invocation,~ Report,· 
Tb. 5, p. 28. Rows (13) and (14), U.S. Tariff Commissi9n, Lead and Zinc, Report.:!:.£ lli President (1962) 
Under Executive Order 10401 (Washington, 1962), Tb. 9, p. 22. -J co 
TABLE XIV 
STAINLESS-STEEL TABLE FLATWARE 
Years Before Invocation After Invocation 
Economic Conditions 1953 1956 1958 1960 1962 1963 
Annual Tariff Quota (l,000 dozen pieces) (1) - - - 5,750 5,750 5,750 
Rate of Duty or Ad Valorem Within Quota (2) noa. n.a. 23.2 17-42 17-43 17-25 Equivalent (percent) In Excess of Quota 60-163 60-196 87~94 
Domestic Consumption (1~000 dozen pieces) (3) 11,563 22,309 22,775 29,363 26,074 28.,203 
Domestic Production (1,000 dozen pieces) (4) 11,020 14,695 15,030 19,332 21,339 21,366 
Imports (1,000 dozen pieces) (5) 833 7,999 9,180 10,900 5,163 6,334 
Ratio of Imports to Consumption (percent) (6) 7.6 35.9 40.3 37.1 19.8 22.5 
Prices (dollars per dozen pieces)a (7) 1.82 2.17 2.12 2.10 2.05 2.13 
Employntent (No. of workers) (8) 1,882 2,382 . 2,326 2,510 2,793 2,838 
Wages (dollars per man-hours) (9) 1.75 1.95 2.08 2.24 2.22 2.39 
a Average net sale value by tlomestic manufacturers. 
Sources: Row (1), Uo s. Tariff Commission, Stainless-Steel Table Flatware, Report to the President 
(1961) Under Executive Order 10401 (Washington, 1961), p. 3. Row (2), 1958, U.S. Tariff Commission, 
Stainless-Steel Table Flatware, Report 1.£ ~ President 2£ Escape-Clause Investigation No. 61 Under~ 
Provisions of Section Z of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, ~ Amended (Washington, 1958), Tb. 2, 
p. 78, for 1960, 1961 Retort, p. 3; for 1962, U. So Tariff Commission, Stainless-Steel Table Flatware, 
Report to~ Presidentl962) Under Executive Order 10401 and Section 351(d) (,!) of the Trade Expansion!.£! 
of 19b2 (Washington~ 1962~. 5; for 1963, U.S. Tariff Commissioni Stainless=Steel Table Flatware, Report 
to the :president on Investigation No. TEA=IA-5 Under Section 35l(d) (g) £! ~ Trade }:Eansion Act 52f 1962 
Z'washington 9 1965T;° po 190 Rows (3)9 (4) 9 (5) 9 and (6), Ibid., Tb. 4, P• 510 Row (7, Ibid., Tb. 5, p. 52. 




output. The level of production increased from 15 million 
dozen pieces in 1958 to more than 21 million dozens in both 
years of 1962 and 1963. Both the level of employment and 
wage rates increased also. The domestic production was 
profitable in each year from 1959 to 1963. 
The effectiveness of this quota restriction is real. 
The quota reduced imports of table flatware. It increased 
the domestic price, enlarged the domestic share of the market, 
and encouraged domestic capital investmente Modernization 
reduced the cost of production. As can be seen in Table XIV, 
domestic consumption of stainless-steel table flatware has 
been increasing steadily. In fact, in 1964 (not shown in 
the table), the consumption amounted to 33 million dozen 
pieces, representing an increase of about 50 per cent over 
1958, the last year before the escape clause action. 
Estimated consumption may well be in excess of 40 million 
dozen pieces by the year 1970. The demand for stainless-
steel table flatware has been increasing so fast that the 
producers might have done very well even without additional 
protection against imports. 
Cotton Typewriter-Ribbon Cloth 
The escape clause was invoked in September, 1960, which 
resulted in an increase of the duty rate from ·190 7 to 350 9 
per cent ad valorem equivalent. Since that time, economic 
conditions of the domestic producers seem to have improvedo 
Both the level of production and employment increasede As 
can be seen in Table XY, the import restrictions were 
followed by a shift to domestic producers wholly at the 
expense of decreased imports since domestic consumption 
remained very much the same as before. This indicates the 
effectiveness of the escape clause action. 
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The problem of this industry, however, cannot be solved 
by eliminating foreign competitors. The consumption of this 
product is falling in spite of the fact that domestic prices 
were not raised.to take advantage of greater protection. We 
are confronted by a declining industry whose eventual demise 
can be postponed by protection against imports but not 
avoided .. Electric typewriters, which use either nylon or 
carbon-type ribbons, are gradually replacing non-electric 
or manual typewriters, which use cotton ribbonso 
Sheet Glass* 
The tariff rate was increased from 13.5 to J0o2 per 
cent ad valorem in June 1962, after the invocation of the 
escape clause on sheet glass. The main objective of higher 
duty rates in this case was not the elimination of imports 
but an increase in domestic pricesQ This objective has been 
accomplished at least immediately after the tariff was 
raised. The profit position of the industry improved greatly 
though the market share did not change very much. Domestic 
* In the Tariff Schedules of the United States, sheet 
glass is identified as "drawn or blown flat glass;u in the 
Tariff Act of 1930, it was identified as "cylinder, crown, 
and sheet glass. 11 
TABLE XV 
COTTON TYPEWRITER-RIBBON CLOTH 
Years Before Invocation After Invocation 
Economic Conditions 1955 1957 1959 1961 1962 1963 
Rate of Duty or Ad Valorem Equivalent (percent) (1) n.a. n.a. 19.7 35.9 39.5 35.5 
Domestic Consumption (1,000 square yards) (2) 9,041 6,969 · 7,823 7,522 7,692 7,225 
Domestic Production (l,000 square yards) (3) 5,018 3,835 2,911 4,847 6,998 4,496 
Imports (1,000 square yards) (4) 4,363 3,151 4,931 3,309 3,260 2,118 
Ratio of Imports to Consumption (percent) (5) 48 45 63 44 42 29 
Prices (cents per square yard)a (6) 60.7 58.5 57.0 57.4 56.6 47.4 
Employment (No. of workers) (7) 3,085 3,180 :?,750 3,322 3,:?01 3,300 
a Average sale unit value by domestic producers. 
Sources: Row (1), 1959, U.S. Tariff Commission, Cotton Typewriter=Ribbon Cloth, Report to the 
President£!!. Escape-Clause Investi~ation .!'!£• 7=85 Under the Provisions of Section z of the Trade !greements 
Extension~ of 1951, ~ Amended Washington, 1960), Tb. 2, p~ 25; 1961 and 1962, U.S. Tariff Commission, 
Cotton Typewriter-Ribbon Cloth, Report to~ President (No. TEA-IR-6-63) Under Section 35l(d) (!) £! ~ 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (Washington, 1963), p. 5; 1963, U.S. Tariff Commission, Cotton Typewriter-
Ribbon Cloth, Report to the President (No. TEA-IR-6-64) Under Section 35l(d) (l) of the Trade Expansion Act 
of 1962"1'Washington, 196~ p. 3. Rows~) to (5), U.S. Tariff Commission, C~tton Typewriter-Ribbon Cloth, 
Report to the President (No. TEA=IR-6-65) Under Section 35l(d) (1) of the Trade Expansion Act .2f. 1962 
(Washington, 1965)~ Tb. 2~ p. 14. Row (6), Ibid., Tb. 4, p. 16. Row C7)° before invocation, 1960 Report, 





Yea.rs Before Invocation After Invocation 
Economic Conditions 1958 1960 1961 1963 1964 1965 
Rate of Duty or Ad Valorem Equivalent (percent) (1) - - 13.5 30.2 28.9 30.9 
Domestic Consumption (million pounds) (2) 1-,418 1,672 1,646 1,946 2,005 1,956 
Domestic Shipments (million pounds) (3) 1,1.17 1,266 1,274 1,552 1,526 1,528 
Imports (million pounds) ( 4,) 303 411 375 394 479 428 
Ratio of Imports to Consumption (percent) (5) 21.4 24.6 22.8 20.2 23.9 21.9 
Price Indexa (6) 100.0 97.0 97.0 110.9 116.7 110.8 
Employment (no. of workers) (7) 6.,664 7,o86 6,701 7,110 7,261 6,935 
Profit and Loss Expertences net net net 
... (8) n.ao loss profit profit n.a. n.a. 
(million dollars) - 1.3 12.4 
,.,..~ ...... 
aThe Bureau of Labor Statistics index of delivered prices for single-strength sheet glass on November 1 
of each year. The average of 1957 to 1959 is the base. 
Sources: Row (1), U.S. Tariff Commission, Sheet Glass (Blown 2.£ Drawn Flat Glass), Report to the 
President (No. TEA-IR-7-66) Under Section 351(d) {l) O·f the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 ( Washington, 1966), 
Tb. 2, p. 9. Rows (2) to (5), before invocation, U •. S. Tariff Commission, Cylinder, Crown and Sheet Glass, 
Report to the President (No. TEA-IR-7-63) ~. Section 35l(d) (]) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 
(Washington, 1963), Tb. 3, p. 22; after invocation,. 1966 Report, Tb. 5, p. 12. Row (6), Ibid., Tb. 8, p. 15. 
Row (7), before invocation, 12£2. Report, Tb. 7~ p .. 26; after invocation, 1966 Report, Tb. 7, p. 14. Row (8), 
U.S. Tariff Commission~ Drawn .2!. Blown Flat Glass (Sheet Glass)~ Report to the President£.!!: Investigation 




consumption increased in spite of higher prices due to boom 
conditions in building construction and automobile production, 
However, the Tariff Commission pointed out, the sheet glass 
industry may yet be eliminated by technological development 
in the form of float glass, which was first marketed in 19590 
Certain Carpets and Rugs 
The duty reduction was withdrawn on wilton, brussels, 
velvet and tapestry carpets and rugs in June, 1962, which 
resulted in an increase of duty from 21 per cent to 40 per 
cent ad valorem. As a result, imports have virtually left 
the American marketo In 1965, the imports only constituted 
2.4 per cent of the total domestic consumption& However, 
the domestic producers are no better off than they were 
before the escape clause action .. This can be seen in rows 
(3), (6), (7), (8) and (9) of Table XVII; domestic pro-
duction, employment, sales and prices, all declined con-
tinuously after the escape clause act.ion. Therefore, the 
trouble of this industry was not caused by imports., but by 
the inability of the producers to compete with other floor 
coveringso Domestic consumption has been declining steadily 
at an annual rate of 10 per cent since 1959, because tufted 
carpets and other materials are cheaper than woven ones like 
wilton and brussels. 
We may summarize the examination of the 15 domestic 
industries protected by escape clause actions in Table :X:VIIIe 
Out of 15 domestic industries, only five were better off 
TABLE XVII 
CERTAIN CARPETS AND RUGS 
Years Before Invocation 
Economic Conditions 1958 
Rate of Duty or Ad Valorem Equivalent (percent) (1) 21 
Domestic Consumption (1,000 sq. yards) (2) 38,624 
Domestic Production (1,000 sq. yards) (3) 34,258 
Imports (1,000 sq. yards) (4) 4,632 
Ratio of Imports to Consumption (percent) (5) 12.0 
Wholesale Price Index (1957-59"' lOO)a (6) 102 
Employment Index (1960-62 = lOO)b (7) n.a. 
Production Index (1957-60 = 100)0 (8) 96 
Sale Index (1957-60 = lOO)C (9) 98 
a Based on the figures in January of each year. 
bBased on the number of production and related workers. 












1963 1964 1965 
40 40 4o 
29,955 25,048 23,964 
28,290 24,248 23,634 
1,853 949 575 
6.2 3.8 2.4 
94 99 95 
88 Bo 80 
82 70 68 
82 71 69 
Sources: Row (1), U.S. Tariff Commission, Wilton, Brussels, Velvet, and Tapestry Carpets and~, 
Report to the President (No. TEA=IR=5=66) Under Section 35l(d) (!) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 
(Washington, 1966), p. 2. Rows (2) to (5) 9 Ibid., Tb. 2 9 p. 11. Row (6), Ibid., Tb. 6, p. 15. Row (7), 




- A SUMMARY OF THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCE OF THE ESCAPE CLAUSE ACTIONS 
Industry's Domestic Domestic Domestic Domestic 
Conditions After Consumption Production :Employment Wages - Prices Imports 
Escape Action In Industry 
Improved Stagnant Declined Up Stable Down Up Stable Down Up Stable Down Up Stable Down Up Stable Down Up Stable Down 
(1) Women's Fur x x x x x n.a. x-
(2) Hatter's Fur x x x x x x .X 
(3) Dried Figs x x x n.a. n.a. x x 
(4) Alsike Seed x x -x n.a. n.a. x x 
(5)· Watches x x x x x x x 
(6) Bicycles x x x x x _ nea. ·x 
..{-7-~---'I'oweUngs x x x n.a. n.a. n.a.- x-
(8) Clothespins x x x x x ·x x 
(9) Safety Pins x x X- x x x i: 
(10) Thermometers x x x x n.a .. -X x __ 
(11) Lead and_ Zinc x x x x x x x 
(12) Steel Flatware x x x x x x x 
(13) Cotton Ribbon x x x x n.a •. x x 
(14) Sheet Glass x x x x .n.a. x x x 
(15) Carpets x x x x n.a. x x 
Total 5 2 8 5 3 7 .7 ---1--- '- 7 3 2 7 4 4 0 3 4 5 5 2 9 
CX> 
Sources: U.S. Tariff Commission. O'I 
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after the invocation of the escape clause. They are watch 
movements, bicycles, clinical thermometers, stainless-steel 
table flatware and. sheet glass. Two more remained stagnant, 
spring clothespins and cotton typewriter ribbon cloth. The 
eight other industries declined. Whenever economic con-
ditions were improved, the level of domestic consumption 
increased; higher duty rates proved to be of little help to 
the 'industry, when the level of consumption _declined or 
remained stableo .An increase in tariff rates or the 
imposition of import quotas will tend.to push prices up; 
higher prices may curtail domestic. demando The invocation 
of the escape clause is based on past behavior, and on the 
unproven assumption that the demand at the relevant prices 
is highly inelastic. The future of the industry is not 
analyzed since legal action .is based on the pasto Due to . 
this fundamental weakness of the escape clause procedure, we 
conclude that the invocation of the escape clause has helped 
the protected industries chiefly to gain a little time for 
major reforms. Where such changes failed to materialize, 
the deterioration of industry profits continued after a 
brief pause o 
The ineffectiveness of escape clause actions is also 
due to the fact that strong industries are not likely to ask 
for more protection and when they do apply for such pro-
tection, they will usually be turned down by the .. Tariff 
Commission. Therefore, declining industries are represented 
in this li.st by disproportionately large numbers.. Their 
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difficulties stem essentially· from the declining demand for 
their products. This 0 declining" natur,e of the industries 
becomes clearer as we take a look at those products whose 
tariff reductions were reserved under section 225(b) of the 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962. 6 There were 16 products (or 
industries) subject to request for reservation in 1962. 
After.the Tariff Commission's investigation in April, 1964, 
only three of them were found to have improved their economic 
conditions. Twelve other industries did not improve, and 
.one industry simply disappearedo7 Therefore, it is proper 
to say that the declining nature of the protected industries 
not only have rendered escape clause actions.ineffective, but 
also have made the whole escape clause procedure subject to 
challenge • 
6section 225(b) of the 1962 Act requires the President 
to reserve from negotiations for the reductions of any duty 
on articles when the following four conditions are met: 
1) the producers of the articles were found to be seriously 
· injured by the majority vote of the Tariff Commission in 
escape clause investigations before the enactment of the 
1962 Act; 2) but they were not relieved by the invocation 
of the escape clause; 3) the industries had been filed a 
request for reservations; and 4) ?.fter the request, the 
Tariff Commission found and advised the President that 
economic conditions in those industries had not been 
improving since the escape clause investigations~ 
7See U. s. Tariff Commission, Forty-Eighth .Annual 
ReEort, (Washington, 1965), PPo 3-40 
CH.APTER V 
SUMMARY AND ·CONCLUSION 
The beginning of the Trade Agreements Program signified 
the need for a political compromise between the free ·traders 
and the protectionistso Such a compromise was formalized in 
1942 when an escape clause was first included in the trade 
agreement with Mexico. With the growth of protectionist 
forces, the scope of the escape clause had been expanding 
until 1962 when new trade legislation rendered the escape 
clause ineffective. 
The individual ar,i.alysis of each protected industry lead 
to the·conclusion that the long political arguments over the 
escape clause were not justified by their economic importanc~ 
Economically, strong industries do not want or cannot obtain 
this form of protection while sick industries are not cured 
by a reduction in importso 
To a large extent, the ineffectiveness of the escape 
actions in relieving serious injury of domestic industries 
is.due to the difficulty of ma.king predictions which are 
based on past experience; industries in need of more pro-
tection are often depressed by factors other than import 
competitiono 
From the broader viewpoint of the national interest, . . 
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escape clause procedures are needlessly disruptive of world 
trade. ,:Chey cause retaliation and temp.orary shifts in 
product flows leading to the misallocation of resources 
everywhere. The escape clause can in fact defeat the entire 
purpose of free trade legislation, because any expansion of 
trade can become a justification for more protection .. Even 
if this clause is administered with much caution, its mere 
existence in the trade legislation is a menace to foreign 
exporters and domestic importers. 
The demand for escape clause protection can be stopped 
only if it can be shown that demand elasticities prevent 
higher prices from being profitable. Such studies are not 
part of the existing legislation, but they need to be 
conducted if we want to prevent a repetition of past 
mistakes in the future. 
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APPENDIX 
OUTCOME OF ESCAPE-CLAUSE INVESTIGATIONS 
INSTITUTED BY THE U. S, TARIFF 
COMMISSION THROUGH JUNE, 1966 .. 
Investigations instituted by the Commission e 
Investigations dismissed by the Commission 
at applicant's request. 0 •• e O e e 
e Q D G e 
Knit gloves and mittens, wool (6-0)(July 11, 1951) 
Hard-fiber cords and twines (4-0)(Jan. 14, 1953) 
Fluorspar (1st investigation)(6-0)(Nov. 23, 1953) 
Wood screws (4th investigation)(4-0)(Apro 9, 1956) 
Cotton blouses (5-0)(June 22, 1956) 
Certain cotton cloth (gingharn)(5-0)(Jano 29 1957) 
Creeping red fescue seed (1st invest:igation)(5...:o) 
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9 
(May 31, 1961) · 
Umbrella frames (2d investigation)(3-0)(Septo 21, 196·1) 
Umbrellas (3-0)(Septo 21, 1961) 
Investigations terminated by the Commission 
without formal findings •••• 9 •• 9 
Straight pins (1st investigation)(6-0)(June 22, 1954) 
Safety pins (1st investigation)(6-0)(June 22, 1954) 
Leather handbags (6-0)(Maro 14, 1956) 
Toyo cloth caps (4-0)(June 21, 1957) 
Fine-mesh wire cloth (3-2)(July 14, 1958) 
Nails, spikes, tacks, brads, and staples (6-0) 
(Mar. 12, 1959) 
Galvanized fencing wire and galvanized wire 
fencing (6-0)(Mar. 12, 1959) 
Broadwoven silk fabrics (5-0)(June 25, 1959) 
Tennis rackets (4-2)(Apr. 4, 1961) 
Investigations completed by the Commission •••••• 122 
Investigations in which the Commission dismissed the 
applications after preliminary inquiry under 
procedure provided for in Executive orders 
(no reports issued) " ••••• o ••••• 14 
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Marrons (4-0)(Aug. 27, 1948) 
Whiskies and sp'irits (5-0)(Jan. 3, 1949) 
Crude petroleum and petroleum products (4-2) 
(lVIay 3, 1949) 
Hops (4-2)(May 11, 1949) 
Knitted berets (1st investigation)(3-3) 
( July 8, 1949) 
Sponges (3-3)(July 22, 1949) 
Narcissus bulbs (6-0)(Jan. 13, 1950) 
Knitted berets (2d investigation)(5-1) 
(Jano 13, 1950) . 
Reeds (5-0)(Feb .. 17, 1950) 
Beef and veal (3-3)(June JO, 1950) 
Silk woven fabrics (5-0)(Sept. 21, 1950) 
Aluminum and alloys (6-0)(Nov. 21, 1950) 
Lead (5-0)(Jano 25, 1951) · 
Stencil silk, dyed or colored (6-0) 
(June 7, 1951) · 
Investigations in which the Commission decided 
against escape action (no reports sent 
to the President) • o ....... o ••••• 67 
Spring clothespins (1st investigation)(5-1) 
(Deco 20, 1949) 
Wood screws (1st investigation)(4-2) 
(Dec. 29, 1951) 
Blue-mold cheese (5-1)(June 12, 1952) 
Motorcycles an.d parts (4-2)(June 16, 1952) 
Spring clothespins (2d investigation)(3-2) 
(Aug .. 21, 1952) .. 
Groundfish fillets (1st investigation)(J-2) 
(Sept .. 4, 1952) 
Bicycles and parts (1st investigation)(5-0) 
(Octa 9, 1952) 
Glace cherries (3-2)(0ct .. 17, 1952) 
Boni to and tuna, not in oil (3-2) (Nov .. 26, 1952) 
Household china tableware (4-0)(Feb .. 6, 1953) 
Wood screws (2d investigation)(3-1) 
(Mar .. 27, 1953) 
Pregnant mares 1 urine (4-0)(Apr .. 2, 1953) 
Chalk whiting (3-1)(Apr .. 9, 1953) 
Woodwind musical instruments (5-0)(Apr~ 28, 1953) 
Cotton-carding machinery (5-0)(July 29, 1953) 
Metal watch bracelets and parts (6-0)(Augo 20, 1953) 
Rosaries (6-0) (Aug .. 21, 1953) 
Mustard seeds (6-0)(Dec .. 10, 1953) 
Ground chicory ( 5-0) (Sept •. 7 ~ ·19 54) 
Coconuts (6-0)(0ct .. 25, 1954) 
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Wool gloves and mittens (5-1)(Dec .. 28, 1954) 
Glue of animal origin (6-0)(Jan .. 7, 1955) 
Hardwood plywood (1st investigation)(5-0)(June 2, 1955) 
Red fescue seed (1st investigation)(4-0)(June 22, 1955) 
Dressed rabbit furs (6-0)(FebG 29, 1956) 
Cotton pillowcases (3-2)(Nov. 21, 1956) 
Certain jute fabrics (5-0)(lVIay 15, 1957) 
Bicycles ( Jd investigation) ( 6-0) (Aug. · 19, 1957) 
Wool felts, nonwoven (5-0)(Jan. 6, 1958). 
Garlic (2d investigation)(5-0)(Feb. 19, 1958) 
Barium chloride ( 6-0) (Oct. 10, 1958) 
Certain carpets and ru~s (1st investigation) 
(3-2)(Jan. 12, 1959) . 
Scissors and shears (2d investigation)(6-0) 
(Feb. 25, 1959) 
Hand-made glassware (2d investigation)(6-0) 
(May 6, 1959) 
Axes and ay heads (5-0)(May 21, 1959) 
Calf and k~p leather (5-0)(May 29, 1959) 
Hardwood plywood (2d investigation)(4-2) 
(June 22, 1959) 
Mink skins ( 6-0) ( Sept.. 17, 1959) 
Ren fescue seed (2d investigation)(5-0) 
(Oct. 28, 1959) 
Zinc sheet (3-2)(Jan. 14, 1960) 
Women's and children's leather gloves (5-0) 
(Mar .. 21, 1960) 
Typewriters (6-0)(May 10, 1960) 
Lamb, mutton, sheep, and lambs (4-2) 
( June 1 , 19 60) 
Barbed wire (4-0)(Aug. 3, 1960) . 
Cast-iron soil-pipe fittings (6-0)(Aug. 23, 1960) 
Crude horseradish (6-0)(Sept. 15, 1960) 
Hatters' fur (2d investigation)(6-0)(0ct .. 7, 1960) 
Iron ore (5-0)(Deco 30, 1960) 
Ultramarine blue (6-0)(Mare 16, 1961) 
Plastic raincoats (4-2) (Mar. 29, 1961) 
Cantaloups (6-0)(1\/Iar., 30, 1961) 
Cellulose filaments (rayon staple fiber)(4-2) 
(Apr. 10, 1961) . 
Watermelons (6-0) (A:pr. 20, 1961) 
Rolled glass ( 3-2-1) (lVIi:tY 25, 1961) 
Procaine and salts and compounds thereof (3-0) 
(Nov. 2, 1961) 
Standard clothespins (5-0)(Feb. 14, 1962) 
Creeping red fescue seed (2d investigation)(J-2) 
(May 21, 1962) .. 
Vanillin (5-0)(Aug. 20, 1962) 
Softwood lumber ( 5-0) (Febo 14, 1963) 
Hatters' fur (Jd investigation)(6-0)(lVIarch 13, 1963) 
Household china tableware and kitchenware (6-0) 
. (Apr. 5, 1963) 
Earthenware table and kitchen articles (6-0) 
(Apr ... 11, 1963) . 
Certain whisky (6-0)(Apr. 26, 1963) 
Umbrellas and parts of umbrellas (except handles) 
(5-0)(Sept .. 1, 1964) 
Watches and watch movements and parts of watch 
movements (5-0)(0cto 30, 1964) 
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Mushrooms prepared or preserved (5-0) 
(Jano 27, 1965) 
Ice skates ,and parts thereof (5-0) 
(Febo 19, 1965) 
Investigations in which the vote of the Commission 
was evenly divided (reports sent to the 
President) o ••••••••••••••••• 8 
Handmade blown glassware (1st investigation)(3-3) 
(Sept~ 22, 1953) 
Spring clothespins (3d investigation)(3-3) 
(Oct. 6, 1954) 
Wood screws (3d investigation) (3-3) (Oct. 28, · 1954) 
Fluorspar (2d investigation)(3-3)(Jan. 18, 1956) 
Para-aminosalicyli.c acid (3-3) (J'une 14, 1956) 
Binding twines (2-2)(Dec. 9, 1960) 
Hard-fiber cords and twines (2-2) (Dec .. 9, 1960) 
Alsike clover seed (2d investigation)(2-2) 
( Aug.. 7 , 1 9 61 ) 
Investigations in which the Commission decided in 
favor of escape action (reports sent to the 
President) •••• ~ •••••••••• ~ • & 33 
Women's fur felt hats and hat bodies (5-0) 
(Sept .. 25, 1950) 
Hatters' fur (1st investigation)(6-0)(Nov .. 9 1951) 
Garlic (1st investigation)(4-2)(June 6, 1952) 
Watches (1st investigation)(4-2)(June 14, 1952) 
Dried figs (5-0) (July 24, 1952) 
Tobacco pipes and bowls (4-0)(Dec. 22, 1952) 
Screen-printed silk scarves (4-0)(Apr .. 13, 1953) 
Scissors and shears (1st investigation)(4-2) 
(Maro 12, 1954) 
Groundfish fillets (2d investigation)(3-2) 
(May 7, 1954) 
Lead and zinc (1st investigation)(6-0) 
(May 21, 1954) 
Alsike clover seed (1st investigation)(6-0) 
(May 21, 1954) . 
watch movements (2d investigation)(4-2) 
(May 28, 1954) 
Bicycles (2d investigation)(4-1)(Maro 14, 1955) 
Ferrocerium (lighter flints) (6-0) (Dec .. 21, 1955) 
Toweling of flaxt hemp, or ramie (6-0) 
(May 15, 1956) 
Groundfish fillets (3d invef:!tigation)(6-0) 
(Oct .. 12, 1956) 
Velveteen fabrics (6-0)(0ct. 24, 1956) 
Violins and violas (3-2) (Jan. 29, 1957) 
Straight pins {2d investigation)(4-2) 
(Jan .. 30, 1957) 
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Safety pins (2d investigation)(4-2) 
(Jan. JO, 1957) 
Spring clothespins (4th investigation)(4-1) 
· . (Sept. 10, 1957) . 
Stainless-steel table flatware (6-0) (Jan. 10, 1958) 
Umbrella frames ( 1st investigation) (3-2) 
(Jan 14, 1958) 
Clinical thermometers (3-2) (Feb. 21, 1958) 
Lead and zinc (2d investigation)(6-0) 
(Apr. 24, 1958) 
Tartaric acid ( 5-0) (Jan. 14, 1959) 
Cream of tartar (3-2)(Jan. 14, 1959) 
Cotton typewriter-ribbon cloth (4-0) 
· ( June 30, 1960) 
Baseball and softball gloves (6-0) 
(May 1, 1961) 
Ceramic mosaic tile (6-0) (May 10, 1961) 
Sheet glass (6-0)(May ·17, 1961) 
Certain carpets and rugs (2d investigation) 
(4-0) (Aug. 3, 1961) 
Straight pins (3d investigation)(4-2) 
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